

FROM FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE:
CAMPAIGN TRANSITIONS WHEN US-SUPPORT TO
FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS FAILS

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ABSTRACT

FROM FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE:
CAMPAIGN TRANSITIONS WHEN US-SUPPORT TO FRIENDLY
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There exists a great threat to regional and global security, the failed state. With the rise of global threats to US interests coming from adversarial nations, and violent non-state actors who seek to gain an advantage through a failing or failed state, it has brought about a new importance to US policy. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US shifted its policy and resources to counter this phenomena of a failing or failed state. This policy shift is to prevent a state from failing in order to deny opportunities to hostile nations and contain instability in the region through foreign internal defense. This thesis studies the concept of a failing or failed state and determines indicators that can provide early warning to a failing FID campaign and the imminent fall of the US sponsored regime; and also studies pre-requisite conditions that must exist to initiate a potentially successful UW campaign. Through analysis of case studies including Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua, this thesis describes the precursors of a FID campaign failure, preparations for transition from FID to UW, the phasing and timing of the FID to UW campaign transitions, and when the transition from FID to UW is a viable strategic option to re-institute a US friendly regime.

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ACRONYMS

COL	Colonel
DA	Direct Action
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
HN	Host Nation
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IDP	Inter-displaced Personnel
JP	Joint Publication
MAJ	Major
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PE	Preparation of the Environment
SF	Special Forces
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Special Reconnaissance
SWCS	Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history empires have risen and fallen, countries have peaked and declined, power has ebbed and flowed. Nations have meddled in the affairs of others to gain power or prominence, to draw resources or influence from an adversary, to protect an ally from the meddling of others or the threat of overthrow from internal or external forces. The means and ways of providing support to an allied nation vary. Despite the change of strategic interests, names, and support, one thing remains the same, the protection of one's own national interests with the employment of national powers is the primary goal of every relationship.

Alliances and partnerships between nation states began taking form as a national policy in the eighteenth century to advance national interests as opposed to just of the ruling monarchy such as in the American Revolution and French Revolution.¹ Adversarial nations, depending on resources and capabilities available, carried out campaigns of subversion and subterfuge as an option to war, in preparation for war, and sometimes leading to armed conflict.

Since the American Revolution, the United States Government (USG) has supported nations at varying degrees, the level of support and national policy has matured throughout our history. During the 19th century the USG supported partnered or allied nations in a limited capacity due to the United States' limited resources and capacity to do so.

¹ John A. Lynn, *The Cambridge History of Warfare.*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 189-197, 216.

Nearing the turn of the century, the Spanish-American War was an important turning point in the history of the United States (US), with the war resulting in control of the Spanish territories of Guam and Puerto Rico ceded to the United States, and all of Spain's claims of Cuba renounced, the US emerged a world power with overseas possessions and a new stake in international politics that would lead to playing a determining role in European affairs.² At the turn of the 20th century, the resources and capacity for the USG to begin projecting its support and influence overseas grew and culminated with the onset of World War II.

With the onset of World War II, and our official beginning of US involvement following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, FDR made drastic changes in foreign policy and began a more of a whole-of-government approach to wage war on a global scale.³ This rudimentary whole-of-government approach allowed the development of innovative ways of waging war on two fronts. One of the innovations of warfare, which eventually developed into distinct departments within USG and doctrine within the military after the war, was the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) which waged a much different form of warfare from that of conventional forces. As one critic noted, the OSS was FDR's effort to "direct the New Deal's excursion into espionage, sabotage, 'black' propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and other 'un-American' activities." ⁴ These activities had

² Jaime Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," in *Cuba: A Country Study*, ed. Rex A. Hudson (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2002), 32.

³ Lynn, *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, 353-354.

⁴ Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 24.

many negative connotations attached to them from conventional military and political leaders, activities that included:

espionage, counterintelligence in foreign nations, sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla and partisan-group activity . . . various other forms of psychological warfare and underground operations. In essence, OSS assumed operational responsibility in a field previously ignored and scorned by many diplomats and military professionals.⁵

Many of these activities directly correlate with modern UW in that they contribute in supporting an insurgency to remove a hostile regime. However, despite the unique skills of the civilian operators, many of its operations were conducted by personnel from the military with the most coming from the Army.⁶ This started the precedence of meshing civilian with military operators in the conduct of UW.

World War II was significant for many different reasons in the history of the US. First, the US came out as the supreme global superpower with the most potent military, and economic control of the global market. Second, UW as a strategic policy to employ against an enemy became a viable option after seeing the success of OSS operations.⁷ Third, new threats arose from the war that threatened democracy around the world—the Soviet Union’s intentions of expanding Communism.⁸

The US policy of containment was a strategy to contain the spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union by denying access to struggling nations with US

⁵ Ibid., 25.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁸ John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 3-4.

support.⁹ Early examples of the US approach to deny Soviet expansion are drawn from the Truman Doctrine March of 1947. The US decided to support both Greece and Turkey through generalized commitments to resist Soviet expansionism wherever it appeared. The US prompted the Soviets to abandon boundary concessions and base rights in Turkey while making the Sixth Fleet a permanent fixture in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to assist and protect the Greek government from an externally supported communist insurgency.¹⁰ The beginning of modern Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is attributable to the Cold War and preventing the expansion of communism.

After the Second World war, France attempted to reassert itself in what was known as the French Indochinese region, but came into conflict with the Viet Minh, a coalition of Communist and Vietnamese nationalists under French-educated dissident Ho Chi Minh.¹¹ As war efforts escalate, there was a transition from French efforts to to US forces following the Dien Bien Phu crisis which saw the fall of the entrenched camp and eventual fall of the French sponsored Laniel government.¹² Special Operations, primarily SF, began developing relationships, organizing and training indigenous forces in support of the government of South Vietnam.¹³ FID emerged as a doctrinal concept out of efforts like Vietnam and the need for containment against communism through support to

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 22.

¹¹ John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 20-21.

¹² Ibid., 30.

¹³ Ibid., 67.

friendly governments with manuals such as the 1963 version of FM 31-22, *US Army Counterinsurgency Forces*.¹⁴ This manual focused on the specific tasks of providing training, advise, and assistance to indigenous forces.¹⁵ The US sponsored FID campaign grew with the escalation of military action in Vietnam. After the fall of Saigon and the failure of the US sponsored FID campaign, the USG and SF distanced itself from FID due to the stigma of failure in Vietnam.

From the 1950s through the late 1970s, the US provided support to various nations with varying success. Three examples of unsuccessful FID campaigns that are included in this study are Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. These failures, particularly in Cuba, shaped US policy in conducting FID going into the 1980s.¹⁶ In the 1980s, USG successfully conducted FID to defeat an insurgency in El Salvador and provided covert UW support to Afghanistan in its efforts against the Soviets. Both of these operations proved successful. The success in El Salvador began a string of successes for SF conducting FID in places such as Panama, Desert Storm, Bosnia and Kosovo. SF began shifting focus on the type of operations they conducted away from UW. By 2001, few thought that UW would ever be conducted. The terrorist attacks on American soil that occurred 11 September 2001 and the necessity for an immediate response changed the political landscape. By 2003, the USG executed two successful UW campaigns and

¹⁴ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-22, *US Army Counterinsurgency Forces* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963), 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶ Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2001), Introduction.

brought new life to the discussion of UW as a viable strategic option.¹⁷ It also brought about a shift in focus to an old phenomenon with new far reaching implications for global security, the failed state and successful FID campaigns to counter the inherent threat.

The USG shifted a great deal of resources in funding research of countering the failed states with successful FID campaigns and its interrelation with regional and global security. With the rise of global threats to US interests coming from adversarial nations, and violent non-state actors who seek to gain an advantage through a failing or failed state, it has brought about a new importance to US policy. Recently, the US has initiated widespread FID campaigns in and around failing nation states in order to contain instability and deny safe havens for these extremist organizations. This approach is similar to the US campaign of containment against the spread of communism, but, with the unique feature of countering a threat that does not concern themselves with sovereignty but seeks instability. It is now imperative to promote stability and growth in historically failing or failed states that align with US national interests to ensure stability and increased global security. Using UW as an option to overthrow a belligerent in power in a failing or failed state, such as Afghanistan, and transitioning to FID to support a legitimate government to promote stability and security is now doctrine and an accepted option for strategic policy. But, what happens if a US sponsored state fails and a belligerent, potentially supported by a nation hostile to the US, takes power?

¹⁷ Mark Grdovic, SWCS Pub 09-01, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 37-38.

Research Question

Is UW a viable option after a US-sponsored FID campaign to protect a friendly partner or allied nation from an insurgency and lawlessness fails, and a regime hostile to the US comes to power?

Secondary Questions

1. What are indicators of a failing US sponsored FID campaign?
2. What are the requirements for successful transition to UW and successful re-establishment of a US friendly government?
3. What are the indicators that a UW campaign would not be feasible?
4. What are the potential USG shaping actions prior to the failed state that would increase the success of the transition to UW?
5. What are the potential risks vs. gains to executing a UW campaign after a failed FID effort?
6. Describe the “transition” efforts from FID to UW to set conditions for disruption, coercion, or overthrow of a new hostile government.

Assumptions

Research will be conducted on the assumption that the failing/failed state is receiving varying USG support through FID. Efforts to maintain stable, effective governance have failed because of internal or external forces that counter US National interests in the region or lack of political will or resources to ensure a successful FID campaign. Although there are numerous DIME efforts that could follow a failed FID

effort, this paper will look specifically at UW, but will assume a whole of government UW effort.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this research will be limited to nation states supported by the US government through the conduct of FID. External forces that caused the failure of the nation state will vary and will not be the focus of this research (i.e. nation states support to insurgency or subversion, or non-state actors supporting insurgency or lawlessness). US FID to UW transitions and UW campaigns will be approached as a whole-of-government as opposed to a military-only perspective.

Limitations

This thesis will be written as an unclassified document using open source information available on internet databases, the Donovan Research Library, the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) and other sources that are generally available to the public. Many classified documents and sources exist touching on the topics of this thesis; they will only be utilized to ensure that no classified research in this area has been conducted. Only unclassified materials and references will be quoted directly or indirectly in the paper.

Case studies used in the research and presentation of this thesis will be studied through secondary sources and will not involve visits to the countries involved or areas of operations due to lack of dedicated funding for such study.

Significance of Study

This study is significant because the US has suffered a number of FID failures in contemporary history such as in Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, and most recently Yemen. One could argue that US FID efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are both teetering on the edge of failure, and could conceivably end with the overthrow of a US-friendly government. As the most likely example of an extensive US FID effort, there is significant potential for our FID efforts in Afghanistan to ultimately fail as the coalition withdraws from Afghanistan. In each of these cases the US-supported government fell or has the potential to fall to internal and external threats. So this is not a new phenomenon but something that has happened in the past, is happening now, and is likely to happen in the future. Due to this potential, UW is a viable option after a US FID effort has failed.

In Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq, we face state and non-state actors providing various degrees of support to the insurgencies or resistance. Considerations for a follow on UW campaign to reinstate a US-friendly or US-neutral regime, or regain lost territory, becomes a contemporary reality that the US government must consider.

This research fills a wide gap in current research. Studies on UW focused on the transition from UW to FID, but no studies have focused on the FID to UW transition other than to reference this as a potential area of future research. This research seeks viable options for decision makers to make timely decisions not just of when to employ UW as a policy, but to determine what type of preparation of the environment (PE) can be conducted while the territory remains permissive/semi-permissive prior to the fall of a US-supported regime. There are also other concerns that must be considered such as the likelihood of long-term success largely based on how much popular support remains or

can be garnered, US-domestic and international support for such an effort, and the scope of US-involvement which includes strategic calculations related to the potential strategies and the ends, ways, means, as well as risk calculus.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror[ism] is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

— Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 26 November 2007

As noted in the introduction, and as this literature review will highlight, the ideas of transitioning from one failed US effort to support a government to an effort to reinstall a friendly government after failure have never been researched in any detail. A large volume of UW and FID related literature has been published in the last 60 years. Additionally, studies on failing nations have existed for decades, with a significant and understandable increase since the attacks of 9/11 and the resulting US efforts. These sources include books, professional civilian journal articles, military doctrinal manuals, and military journals. Studies have been conducted on the significance of failed and failing states and its interrelation of those states to regional and global security. There are studies on UW, FID, and the transition between UW and FID. However, there are no studies or research on the transition from FID to UW, nor any of the precursors to a FID transition to UW campaign. Below the literature review will explain the doctrinal basis for FID, UW, and the transition between the two, as well as examine information on failed states as it related to USG FID efforts in order to help frame the problem and potential solution related to the thesis.

Foreign Internal Defense

The definition of foreign internal defense has been a little more clear-cut and concise as compared to UW. The accepted definition of FID according to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 is:

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.¹⁸

FID has changed little since the inception of the concept in 1962. According to historical context written on FID in JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, “The concept of foreign internal defense as a way to provide US support to a host nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) plan originated from the Kennedy administration with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 182 in August 1962.”¹⁹ This concept was further fomented during the Vietnam War in support of the government of South Vietnam and continued to grow as a policy to counter the spread of communism.²⁰ FID as a whole involves “the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) through which sources of US power (such as financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to support a HN [Host

¹⁸ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, amended through 15 March 2015), 94.

¹⁹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), I-3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I-2.

Nation] IDAD [Internal Defense and Development] program.”²¹ FID planning and execution is complex and requires a great deal of coordination and integration with national strategy and regional plans, FID planners must understand US foreign policy; focus to maintain or increase HN sovereignty and legitimacy; and understand the strategic implications and sustainability of US assistance to a HN.²²

There are three distinct eras that policy, publications, and doctrine of FID evolved through. The first phase of FID can be identified from the Vietnam War era to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The primary purpose during this era was to deny the Soviet Union influence in nations preventing the spread of communism around the globe.²³ The second era was from the collapse of the Soviet Union to 9/11, where the primary focus of FID was bilateral relationships building with partners and allies, support to other nations against common threats like drugs, and efforts to help the UN stabilized regional issues such as the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo to promote promoting stability and maintaining a global peace. The third era is from the events of 9/11 to today and the near future.²⁴ Since 9/11, the US and our allies and partners have been involved in significant FID actions, on a scale unseen since Vietnam. Now our efforts are focused on denying safe havens for the 9/11 family of threats, from al Qaeda to their other Sunni-extremist offshoots.²⁵ These efforts have caused the US and its partners to increasingly face the

²¹ Ibid., I-5.

²² Ibid., VI-2.

²³ Ibid., I-2.

²⁴ LTC Derek Jones, e-mail to author, 1 April 2015.

²⁵ Ibid.

reality of failed FID efforts that lead to regional and global instability in the form of failing and failed states.

FID campaign planning possesses basic planning imperatives that increase the probability of success. The first imperative, and of utmost importance, is maintaining HN sovereignty and building the legitimacy of the nation supported.²⁶ HN sovereignty and legitimacy is directly tied to the effectiveness and success of the HN's IDAD plan.

According to JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, "IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security."²⁷ One of the primary objectives of FID is to assist the HN in developing an appropriate IDAD plan that blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats that include balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.²⁸

The next imperative is critical prior to execution of FID, you must have an understanding of long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance.²⁹ This imperative correlates with the time and resources that it will take to augment the capability of the HN's capacity to sustain the IDAD program and the second and third order effects.

²⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, IV-2.

²⁷ Ibid., I-1.

²⁸ Ibid., II-1-II-2.

²⁹ Ibid., IV-2.

Next, military support must be tailored for the operational environment and the specific needs of the HN that the US supports through FID.³⁰ Considerations of the environment, threat, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors are key to ensuring the appropriate support is rendered.

Unity of effort/unity of purpose is a key imperative that ensures that FID, a national-level program effort, properly integrates all facets of national power that also include IGOs, NGOs, and HN capabilities.³¹ This is key in order to maximize effects and reduce inefficiencies in support of FID and HN IDAD efforts.

Unity of effort/unity of purpose plays into the next imperative in that we must have an understanding of US foreign policy in order to ensure that the FID plan supports a HN IDAD plan that is in-line with US national interests in that nation.³²

Additionally, the final two imperatives are understanding the information environment and sustaining the effort.³³ With the speed of communications and the emergence of social media, planners must be cognizant of the reality that all FID operation have the potential from moving from obscurity to the center stage of global media. Any failure, due to unsustainable efforts or failure due to lack of resources will be known worldwide instantaneously and can have resounding effects on US interests globally.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., IV-2-IV-3.

³² Ibid., IV-3.

³³ Ibid., IV-3-IV-4.

The concept of FID chronologically relates to the conventional military's joint phasing where combat operations transition over to enabling civil authority.³⁴ As conventional combat units transition from phase III (dominate) to phase IV (stabilize), you see an increase in the involvement of the HN.³⁵ It is during the transition from phase IV (stabilize) to phase V (enable civil authority) that you see a significant transfer of authority to the HN. The purpose of enabling the civil authority is to assist the HN regain its ability to govern as well as administer services and other needs to the local populace.³⁶ It is at the end of phase V that conventional units meet their military endstates and transition to FID at the operational and strategic level ensues. JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, and JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, do not evaluate the transition from FID to UW if a FID campaign fails.

The US after the Vietnam War focused on conducting FID in nations that were in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union as a part of the strategic policy of containment.³⁷ There is a plethora of documents and publications regarding this type of FID. The countries selected for the case studies fall under this type of FID that focused on maintaining US friendly democratic governments. Several CGSC MMAS theses and School of Advance Military Studies Monographs written on FID campaigns executed countering the Soviet threat exists. A CGSC MMAS written in 1978 by MAJ Charles R.

³⁴ LTC Derek Jones, email to author, 3 April 2015.

³⁵ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), V-9.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, I-2.

Schribner called *A Comparative Policy-Process Approach to Vietnam Intervention* that compares the differences of policy between the Johnson administration and Eisenhower's administration in dealing with Vietnam. It represents a perspective of FID from the political or strategic level in Vietnam. Another CGSC MMAS thesis written in 2007 by Major Thomas E. Clinton, Jr called *Lessons Learned From Advising the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces During the Vietnam War* speaks on the historical significance of using military advisors to build the defense capacity of the HN which is a tenet of FID. With respect to doctrine and manuals, two good manuals were developed as a result of the Cold War but have since been revised; they are FM 21-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, published in 1994, and the 2004 Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*. These manuals are among the most clear and concise documents dealing with FID up until that time.

Unconventional Warfare

The accepted definition of UW approved in May 2009 by U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC currently in *the* Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* as amended through 15 August 2014 is, "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area."³⁸

³⁸ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 255.

There are three distinct eras that doctrine and publications of UW evolved through. The first two eras are characterized by the focus of containing or undermining the spread of communism and the need to accomplish it without the escalation to nuclear war.³⁹ The first era can be identified from post World War II to pre-Vietnam War in the mid 1960s. The second era runs from the Vietnam War to pre 9/11, this era was greatly influence by the confusion of mission sets resulting from the Vietnam War. SF took on a supporting role with the Central Intelligence Agency taking lead in many UW campaigns in limited war scenarios conducted between the late 1970s and 1990s in places in Central and South America and Iran as well as several in Southeast Asia.⁴⁰ Post 9/11, you see a resurgence of UW as a viable option in strategic policy after successful campaigns in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance and Northern Iraq.⁴¹ SF began studying UW as one of its original core tasks and strived to find a clear concise definition with a convening working group held at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) in 2009 that now exists in Joint Publication 1-02 posted above.

Doctrine on UW following World War II was still in its infancy in that:

organization, equipment, and doctrine were reexamined in view of the possibility of nuclear war, but in this process the division remained a fundamental military organization. Simultaneously, however, a few thinkers began to consider the possibility of forces capable of operating at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum from nuclear war, below the level of conventional war.⁴²

³⁹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 217.

⁴⁰ Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 35-37.

⁴¹ Ibid., 37-38.

⁴² Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 1.

UW was a viable tool to utilize in nations that had succumbed to communism and the iron curtain. It was a more cost effective option with minimal forces to achieve mass effects with the purpose of undermining communist governments.

Limited historical military documents being FM 31-20 series of manuals (1961 and 1965) existed from this era. These manuals are the last versions prior to Special Forces involvement in Vietnam that capture the essence of UW as we know it today. A prominent historical account of the exploits of the OSS and the execution of UW in World War II is written by Colonel (retired) Aaron Bank in his book *From OSS to Green Berets* written in 1986. A valuable document written in 1961 by OSS and CIA veteran Frank Lindsay, *A Basic Doctrine for the Conduct of UW*, gives the framework for many documents and doctrine for UW as we know it today. The document outlines a carefully planned sequence of steps for the development of an organized resistance in a territory, and what key requisites must be present, ones that cannot be replicated, in order to conduct a successful UW campaign.⁴³ During this era, UW campaigns were spearheaded primarily by the CIA with the SF in a support role.⁴⁴

During the Vietnam War, SF's role as a focused UW force to support guerrilla warfare against the Soviets is overcome by the experience in Vietnam. Vietnam ushers in new missions sets for SF such as special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA).⁴⁵ UW is relegated to a lesser mission due to the Vietnam experience.

⁴³ Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 35-37.

⁴⁵ Derek P. Jones, "Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter" (Master's Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 2006), 5.

Historical accounts of operations conducted by the CIA with limited SF support exist, but confusion of terminology cloud the significance of the publications existing. Several historical manuals exist as a result of this era but have since been revised, updated, or have been replaced. The first historical manual is U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations* (1999), since replaced; the second is Change 1, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (2004), since revised; and third, FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (2003), now FM 3-05.130. All three manuals use the old UW definition found in the 2001 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

The most recent era is where you find the most valuable documents and manuals that define and describe UW as a concept. According to JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, published in July 2014, UW is a Special Operations core activity conducted to put pressure on a hostile government, occupying power, or nation-state.⁴⁶ In UW operations, USG objectives range from support to groups resisting government authority to the overthrow of the government.⁴⁷ Traditional UW focuses on supporting opposition groups in typically denied areas restricted due to the hostile governing authority. UW as a national strategic option seeks to influence, coerce, disrupt, or foster change in a governing authority through support of an opposition group that can develop into a resistance movement, or insurgency.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II-8.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., II-9.

In Training Circular (TC) 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, published in November 2010, it shows several examples of US sponsored limited-involvement operations designed to pressure a hostile governing authority such as in Cuba in the 1960s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, and Nicaragua also in the 1980s.⁴⁹ TC 18-01 discusses the seven dynamics of insurgency which will be discussed in Chapter 3, and the seven phases of UW. For this literature review, we will focus on phase I, phase II, and phase VII.⁵⁰ During phase I, this entails preparation of the environment which includes preparing the human terrain to accept US support.⁵¹ Phase II is the initial contact with the allied government in exile or resistance leadership to begin coordination for the desired US support.⁵² Phase VII is the transition from UW forces back to national control, transitioning to conventional forces, or demobilization.⁵³ The premise of this research is to determine if UW is a viable option once a US sponsored FID campaign has failed.

⁴⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2010), 1-8.

⁵⁰ The seven phases of UW are phase I-preparation, phase II-initial contact, phase III-infiltration, phase IV-organization, phase V-build up, phase VI-employment, and phase VII-transition. The focus will only be on phases I, II, and VII because they directly correlate with the premise of this research which is determining if UW is a viable option following a failed state. Determining the viability requires research on transition points of which preparation and initial contact would be required to begin an effective UW campaign. Transition to national control in phase VII can serve as a model for transitioning from FID to UW. See TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-9.

⁵¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-8.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

During the FID campaign in each case study, the US has freedom of movement in a permissive to semi-permissive environment. This will necessitate a modification of UW phases and principles to adjust to the different operational environment.

Several studies have been written on UW, specifically on the transition from UW to FID in order to maximize the gains of a successful UW campaign. A Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis written by MAJ Derek P. Jones titled “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter,” spearheaded the addition of transitioning to FID from UW.⁵⁴ Prior to this study, phase VII was simply demobilization of the guerrilla force stemming from experiences of the Second World War. This study recognized the need to identify the transition point marking the end of combat operations but not necessarily conflict termination.⁵⁵ Failure in identifying this point did not allow a shift of focus to protect the interim government through counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, which allowed budding insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ This shift in mindset described in this thesis caused the addition of transition to phase VII.

Another study from the Naval Post Graduate School is a thesis written by Ryan C. Agee, and Maurice K. DuClos December of 2012, in which they continued research on UW to determine what factors lead to the use of UW as a strategic policy option,

⁵⁴ Jones, “Why Words Matter,” 138.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 141.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

essentially the why of UW.⁵⁷ Agee and DuClos focus on the decision point, and the events prior to that point in time that lead to the decision-makers approval of UW as a strategic option.⁵⁸ The study analyzes the events, conditions, environment, and context that causes decision-makers to “ratchet up” resources and activities culminating with the evolution into a UW campaign.⁵⁹ This point of view depicts the perspective of a more traditional UW sense and gives explanation of what factors lead to UW as a viable option against a hostile regime.

The study of transition to FID following a successful UW campaign necessitated a change in doctrine to accommodate a more functional transition to maximize gains. Neither the D. Jones study, or the study on determining the decision point and the why of UW analyze the perspective of a failed US sponsored FID campaign. No UW or FID doctrine and research exists that studies the transition to UW from the perspective of a failed US sponsored FID campaign.

Failing/Failed States Post 9/11

The concept of a failed state is a recently rediscovered concept that went through limited study prior to 9/11. This concept distinctly has two eras, fall of the Soviet Union to the attacks of 9/11, and 9/11 attacks to the present. Prior to the attacks, weakened and failed states were studied in the interest of humanitarian aid; any type of assistance was

⁵⁷ Ryan C. Agee and Maurice K. DuClos, “Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for Unconventional Warfare” (Master’s Thesis, USN Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2012), 1-2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 36-37.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

rendered for 9/2the sake of peace and humanity peacekeeping and peace enforcement, etc. Although largely not labeled as a FID campaign, they clearly fit within the definition of FID. Today, the concept has center stage because of the link to global security. As of today, there is no widely accepted definition of a failed state, but according to many books, studies, websites and publications, they all possess the same characteristics described by the Global Policy Forum in that the failed state:

can no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty. Within this power vacuum, people fall victim to competing factions and crime, and sometimes the United Nations or neighboring states intervene to prevent a humanitarian disaster. However, states fail not only because of internal factors. Foreign governments can also knowingly destabilize a state by fueling ethnic warfare or supporting rebel forces, causing it to collapse.⁶⁰

For the purpose of this research and to develop a more precise, common understanding of the definition, the following attributes, proposed by the Fund for Peace and Princeton University, will be used to define a failed state:

loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force there in, erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.⁶¹

A report written by Robert D. Lamb that was published in 2008 was prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) as the final report of the Ungoverned Areas Project named “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe

⁶⁰ Global Policy Forum, “Failed States,” last modified 8 November 2014, accessed 8 November 2014, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html>.

⁶¹ Princeton, “Failed State,” Princeton University, last modified 9 November 2014, accessed 9 November 2015, https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Failed_state.html.

Havens.” It breaks down and defines what ungoverned areas are, how they become safe havens for illicit activity, the type of activity and transnational threats they attract, and the threat they pose to national security.⁶² Another excerpt, the first chapter written by Robert I. Rotberg, from a book that emerged from a five-year project of the World Peace Foundation and Harvard University’s Program on Intrastate Conflict on all aspects of state failure. This excerpt, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weakened States: Causes and Indicators” written in 2002, also describes the effects of ungoverned areas and establishes criteria for distinguishing between collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress.⁶³ A CGSC MMAS Thesis written in 2003 by MAJ Matthew R. Lewis called *Warlords and Democratization* looks at the changes that occurred in national security strategy following the collapse of the Soviet Union, changes that the democratic peace theory plays in achieving global peace and prosperity.⁶⁴ MAJ Lewis touches on the rise of warlords in many states following the collapse and how they utilized the limited resources of the state for violence, and it examines the relationship between state collapse, warlords, and nation building.⁶⁵

⁶² Robert D. Lamb, “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens” (Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 17-19, 32-33

⁶³ Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Harvard University, 2003), 5-10.

⁶⁴ Matthew R. Lewis, “Warlords and Democratization” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 2003), 2, 7-8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

Another article from the Contemporary Security Policy written by Edward Newman in 2009 called *Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World* the effects of failed states on the international order and global security. Most importantly it analyzes seven different indexes used to analyze criteria of a failed state. The article articulates the disparity that exists in ranking and determining a failed state due to the lack of a common definition. Though, most of the indexes base their analyses of countries based on effectiveness and legitimacy across four fundamental dimensions: security/military, governance, economic development, and social development.⁶⁶ These are the same dimensions mentioned in the book *Plan B 4.0* written by Lester Brown and published 2009. This book goes into detail explaining causes and indicators of failing and failed states more from a perspective of a humanitarian, but emphasizes a great deal on the threat to global stability and security.⁶⁷ Another book called *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* written by Stewart Patrick and published in 2011 also studies the effects of ungoverned areas, transnational threats, as well as patterns of failed states, criteria that they usually meet, trajectory of failing states, and the causes of failure.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Edward Newnan, “Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (December 2009): 421–443, accessed 9 October 2014, DOI: 10.1080/13523260903326479, 27.

⁶⁷ Lester R. Brown, *Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization* (New York: Earth Policy Institute, 2009), 18-20, 186.

⁶⁸ Stewart Patrick, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 36-41, 135-173.

Summary

The concepts of UW and FID have been studied in depth are operationally connected to one another when speaking of transition. FID, as a means to contend with the global threat of a failed state has also been studied with examples in recent history. As is apparent, the study of failing and failed states focuses on the causes and effects, indicators and criteria, and all of the symptoms involved with a failed state. Although the research on the topic of failed states has recently been re-energized, there is still no common definition that the different indexes that can be utilized for evaluation. Regardless of the definition of failed state, there are no definitive studies on the transition of UW, or to put it on other terms, the transition back to UW following a failed US sponsored FID campaign and assumption of a failed state.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this research is to determine if UW is a viable option following a failed US FID effort. This will be conducted by determining indicators leading up to the failure and resulting overthrow of the US-friendly government, and the feasibility of preparing and shaping the environment in preparation for the transition to a UW campaign to reinstate a US friendly or US neutral regime following a failed FID campaign. This will be accomplished using a combination of two research methods: comparative historical research and case studies. In this chapter we will answer the secondary questions of: (1) determining indicators of a failing US sponsored FID campaign leading up to the failure and resulting overthrow of the US-friendly government, (2) determining the requirements for successful transition to UW and subsequent re-establishment of a US friendly government, and (3) determine indicators that a UW campaign would not be feasible.

Research will focus on three failed US- sponsored FID campaign case studies and subsequent UW efforts in Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Iran presents a case study that offers an example of conditions where many indicators of a failing state and failing regime existed and where the US was expelled shortly after the collapse of the Regime completely negating the opportunity to conduct UW.⁶⁹ In Cuba, they maintained close ties and received US support from the onset following the Spanish American War. Many

⁶⁹ Krysta Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979: The Downfall of American-Iranian Relations," *Legacy* 11, no. 1, Article 2: 8 (2011), accessed 29 March 2015, <http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/legacy/vol11/iss1/2>.

indicators existed, but more importantly, following the Cuban Revolution the US attempted a major unsuccessful UW campaign with the Bay of Pigs that resulted in direct alignment with the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ Nicaragua is historically similar to Cuba in respects to the relationship with the US and the execution of a UW campaign against the Sandinista government, though, the Contras did not have the desired effects of removing the government by themselves due to the lack of popular support and successful counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Sandinista government. The whole of government approach by the US ultimately led to elections where the Sandinista government was replaced with a more moderate government.⁷¹

Research of each case study will begin with a historical background of the country that leads to the necessity of US intervention; the determination of the type of support/FID the US was giving the country, the result of collapse focusing on the causes of collapse, and then US UW actions after the fall and lessons learned from these efforts. Each country will be evaluated to determine which indicators were present previously to becoming a failed state by the fragile states index that evaluates twelve different indicators that cover social, economic, political, and military/security categories. Once the indicators that led to failure are evaluated and identified, an evaluation will be conducted to determine if indicators were present in order to conduct UW in that country following the collapse. The country will be evaluated according to its UW potential following collapse, or its prerequisite conditions that must exist and cannot be fabricated

⁷⁰ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 71.

⁷¹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 184.

in order for a successful UW campaign to be executed; conditions that could not be influenced during the FID campaign.

To further explore the indicators of a failed state, the twelve indicators are divided into four categories that include, as discussed, social, economic, political, and military/security (see Figure 1). The social indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and inter-displaced personnel (IDPs), group grievance, and human flight and the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people from a particular country. Demographic pressures are, “Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters [that] make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will.”⁷² These types of pressures can also include population growth coupled with food and water scarcity that eventually leads to malnutrition en masse and an increased mortality rate, increased environmental and pollution issues, and a “youth bulge” that leaves a very large disenfranchised demographic of young people. Refugees and IDPs are, “Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat.”⁷³ This indicator measures displacement per capita coupled with the absorption capacity related to natural resources available, and the diseases related to displacement. Group grievance is, “when tension and violence exists between groups, the state’s ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.”⁷⁴ The tension and violence can be attributable

⁷² J. J. Messner et al., ed., *Fragile States Index X 2014* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2014), accessed 10 November 2014, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf>), 10.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

to general discrimination and powerlessness caused by religious, ethnic, sectarian, and or communal violence. Human flight and brain drain results “when there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.”⁷⁵ This focuses on the emigration of the educated populace that possesses the capacity to direct positive change or necessary services.



Figure 1. Fragile State Indicators Chart

Source: J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft, Kendall Lawrence, Laura Bridard, and Felipe Umana. *Fragile States Index X 2014*, ed. J. J. Messner (Washington DC: The Fund for Peace, 2014), 10, accessed 10 November 2014, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

The economic indicators include uneven economic development, as well as poverty and economic decline. Uneven economic development is a little more complex and occurs, “When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.”⁷⁶ Uneven economic development indicates a greater disparity of income indicating a smaller group controls a higher percentage of the income share. It takes into account the slum population and measures the distribution of urban-rural services and overall access to improved services. Poverty and economic decline, “strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.”⁷⁷ This focuses on the capacity of the state to manage its resources and measures the economic deficit, government debt, purchasing power, GDP and growth rate, inflation and the effects of the unemployment and youth employment.

Political and military indicators are interlaced by their relational connection of functions. The state, by design, ideally manages and directs the military and the capacity to provide security for its populace. Political and military indicators include state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention. The critical indicator for these two categories is the measurement of state legitimacy, “corruption and a lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine the social contract.”⁷⁸ This is the overall measurement of government effectiveness considering levels of democracy,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

corruption, and political participation. It also considers the electoral process, protests and demonstrations, power struggles, drug trade, and the illicit economy.

Public services are the provisions of, “health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state.”⁷⁹ This measures the availability and effectiveness of the infrastructure that is provided by the state by assessing the quality of healthcare, internet access, energy reliability, water, sanitation, educational provisions, and the existing road system. Also, an assessment is considered of the effectiveness of the policing of criminal activity.

Human rights and rule of law directly correlates with the legitimacy of the state, “when human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility.”⁸⁰ This indicator encapsulates the civil liberties covered in the 1st amendment of the US Constitution and assesses press freedom, amount of religious persecution, and includes political prisoners, torture, executions, and human trafficking.

Factionalized elite directly affects the overall status of the state, “When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract.”⁸¹ Influence of the elites on the general populace and the government is inevitable; power struggles, defectors, and flawed elections are measured to establish the preponderance of fragility.

The security apparatus more directly correlates with the traditional purpose of the military, “The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups.”⁸² Key factors affect the ability of legitimate military and police forces to provide security to the populace such as internal conflict, rebel activity, riots and protests, militancy, bombings, and small arms proliferation. Military coups and political prisoners which obviously affect security in the state are also considered under this indicator.

The most dynamic indicator is external intervention, “When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.”⁸³ This can come by both positive and or negative influencing in the form of foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers and UN missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions and also considers the state’s credit rating.

Once the state is evaluated according to the failed state criteria and is identified as a failing or failed state, it will be evaluated for its UW potential. UW potential is essentially establishing if the essential critical characteristics exist in the environment that would support a successful US sponsored UW campaign:

There are two categories planners use when deciding to provide support. The first category is feasibility. Feasibility is dependent upon the physical and human conditions of the environment. The second category is appropriateness. Appropriateness is dependent upon the characteristics of the resistance movement. . . . Planners further break down feasibility and appropriateness into the seven dynamics of an insurgency.⁸⁴

Determining the feasibility of conducting UW in a state prior to a failing or failed FID campaign becomes very critical prior to execution. The physical and human

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-3.

environmental conditions must exist in this type of environment just as it should when conducting traditional UW prior to any type of US presence in a state that the US would like to influence.⁸⁵

Since the primary purpose in UW is to supplant an existing entity in power to replace with one that leans more towards US interests, we must evaluate the existing or potential adversarial organization and determine if it possesses, or will possess the following five criteria.⁸⁶ These criteria are a compilation that integrate the seven dynamics of insurgency that apply to a pure UW insurgency adapted to fit the needs of this research, which is the perspective of what occurs following the failure of a US sponsored FID campaign.

The first criteria is a weakened or unconsolidated governmental structure must exist that lacks the capability to maintain power and control over the populace.⁸⁷ Additionally, the resistance must have the inverse and possess an organized structure that can fill the void and set the conditions in order to undermine the hostile regime and challenge their ability to regain legitimacy and popular support.⁸⁸ According to the TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, “conditions must sufficiently divide or

⁸⁵ Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 23.

⁸⁶ The following five criteria are a modified set of criteria that includes work by LTC Mark Grdovic, TC 18-01, and the seven dynamics of an insurgency that can be found in both products. See Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 23-25; Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-3 to 1-5 and 2-1 to 2-6.

⁸⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-3.

⁸⁸ LTC Derek Jones, email to author, 18 April 2015.

weaken the organizational mechanisms that the ruling regime uses to maintain control over the civilian population for the resistance to successfully organize the minimum core of clandestine activities.”⁸⁹

The next criteria is the will of population. In a FID campaign, assessing the will of the population will be easier to assess due to the permissive or semi-permissive environment as opposed to a traditional UW setting. The populace must be willing to bear the hardships associated with the harsh, repressive countermeasures that the hostile regime may employ.⁹⁰ They must be willing to support a regime change or potentially another regime change depending if a hostile regime conducted a violent takeover. You must ask if the population represents the popular support and if they are willing to organize and follow the resistance stated in the first criteria.⁹¹

If the populace is able, there must exist favorable terrain to support a resistance.

In order to conduct operations, resistance forces require human and physical terrain that provides safe haven. This terrain must possess enough security for resistance members to train, organize, and recuperate. The resistance must locate safe havens in relatively inaccessible areas that restrict the ability of the HN military force to project power and exert control.⁹²

Favorable terrain can be determined during a FID campaign while assessors still possess the freedom of movement in a permissive/semi-permissive environment. The physical terrain is not limited to the traditional jungle-covered mountains but can include urban or

⁸⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-3.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 1-4.

⁹¹ LTC Derek Jones, email to author, 18 April 2015.

⁹² Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-4.

rural terrain contain “artificial” terrain in the form of ghettos, refugees camps, and even across sympathetic international borders.⁹³ This can also include access to cyber space. The key is that the physical and human terrain must have the capacity to protect and support the resistance.

If there exists favorable physical and human environmental conditions to conduct UW, the organized structure that possess the capacity to challenge the regime must be willing to cooperate with the US, they must have compatible objectives and ideology, and possess a capable resistance leadership.⁹⁴ This organization must be able to leverage the will of the population to reach the desired endstate that remains in-line with US national interests. They must also have the capacity to physically receive US support.

If a suitable candidate exists that is willing and able to resist the occupying or potential occupying adversary, the ability to transform into an insurgency and pass through the phases of development onto a war of movement in order to undermine and eventually overthrow an occupying power and replace it with a US friendly regime must be confirmed.⁹⁵ The seven dynamics, or some combination thereof, are utilized to provide a framework to “transform popular disconnect into an organized and effective movement.”⁹⁶

⁹³ Grdovic, *A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 24.

⁹⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, TC 18-01 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-5.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 2-1, 2-6.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 2-3.

The first is leadership, the dynamic of leadership is imperative to take a group committing random political violence, provide it “vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence”; and turn it into an insurgency that specifically targets the ties of the people and the government or occupying power.⁹⁷ The purpose is to eventually replace the occupying power’s legitimacy with its own.

The insurgency must have an ideology that justifies its “actions in relation to the movement’s grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo.”⁹⁸ According to TC 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, “ideology will serve as the rallying call for all members of the population to join the struggle. The ideology of the insurgency and the motivation of the insurgent must remain linked. Once delinked, the counterinsurgent will be able to address individual grievances and negate the unity of the insurgency.”⁹⁹ Leadership and ideology will contribute in developing objectives, it is imperative to have strategic, operational, and tactical goals with intermediate objectives that will provide a general direction and vision for the movement. The insurgency must have an endstate.

Another critical dynamic is external support; this will be provided by the USG in which ever form necessary to ensure success.¹⁰⁰ Support will vary depending the capacity of the resistance force, operational environment, and basic need. The remaining dynamics are environment and geography which refers to the physical environment discussed

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 2-4.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2-5.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 2-6.

earlier in the third criteria. Phasing and timing, which is a critical part in confirming the resistance movements capacity to pass through the phases of development onto the war of movement phase to action change.¹⁰¹ Phasing and timing can be influenced or controlled by the US entities executing UW support; organization and operational patterns, essentially the order of battle, can also be influenced by US entities executing UW support.¹⁰²

The potential of success in a UW effort increases if elements can be identified prior to a FID failure, trained in the art of insurgency to increase their potential in relation to the dynamics and plans can be developed for the UW campaign to support these entities. Proper preparation of the environment prior to FID failure changes the potential for success significantly.

After thorough research is conducted on each of the case studies according to the criteria above, patterns will be deduced on the indicators of a failing state, what characteristics are present in all case studies, and what indicators and characteristics that lead to the failed state will contribute to a viable transition back to UW. Through those indicators and characteristics, identify at what point it is determined that a failed state is inevitable in each of the cases, and determine what could have been done at that point to facilitate a rapid transition to UW. Once patterns are determined common to all case studies, what changes in FID campaign planning are necessary to make UW (if necessary) politically feasible, beneficial, and preferred by the USG once a failed state ensues?

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 2-5-2-7.

¹⁰² Ibid., 2-7-2-8.

This study will be completed when the research questions have been adequately answered, a model developed that can be used to develop a doctrinal pattern for FID campaign planning to include facilitating a follow-on UW campaign (if feasible), and finally with any suggestions for current or future doctrinal or policy changes in FID campaign planning, and or any other necessary changes identified by this study to include future research.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Analysis in this chapter is based on historical research conducted on three separate case studies. A historical background of events that caused US intervention is established that eventually lead to the regime change. This background along with the climactic event that served as the tipping point will set the conditions necessary to evaluate if indicators of a failed state existed and when they became apparent prior to the collapse of the regime. An evaluation of existing conditions following the collapse will be tempered against a set of modified criteria that are necessary for a successful UW campaign to reinstate a US friendly regime. This analysis is necessary to determine whether transition to UW is feasible, whether existing conditions following collapse can pose a substantial risk or potential gains to US national interests, and what can be done prior to collapse to make conditions more ideal for an effective UW campaign which will be discussed in chapter 5.

Iran

The Iran case study is an example of a failed US-supported FID program, leading to the overthrow of the US-backed Shah, but had no potential to transition to a UW campaign. Iran as a case study contains sufficient historical background and continues to remain relevant in today's operational environment. Iran post-Islamic Revolution represents a situation where once the US sponsored regime in place fails, all relations cease to exist becoming a denied area. The US provided support to the government of

Iran, more specifically to Mohammed Reza Shah, to maintain a US/British friendly regime beginning in 1953 up until the Islamic Revolution in 1979.¹⁰³ Its contemporary history is evaluated according to indicators of a failed state, and feasibility of transitioning to UW is determined according the aftermath following the fall of the US friendly regime. This provides data to analyze and assist in answering the primary research question of UW as a viable option when a US-sponsored FID campaign has failed.

Historical Background

Iran has had a tumultuous history, particularly in that last 200 years, that has shaped Middle Eastern politics, regional stability, and impacted the global economy. Its geographic location with an expansive border with Russia and straddling a land route to Great Britain's richest colony, India, placed Iran in a collision with the era's two great imperial powers of the early 20th century.¹⁰⁴ Compounded with its vast reserves of fossil fuels discovered in the 20th century, Iran was destined to play center stage in geopolitics. In order to understand Iran's recent history and the effects of the climactic event being the Islamic Revolution in 1979, one must understand a plethora of factors that include conditions that existed following the coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh from power in 1953; the sequence of events that occurred during the Pahlavi Dynasty that saw the transition of power from father, Reza Shah, to son, Mohammed

¹⁰³ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 4.

¹⁰⁴ Helen C. Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987), "The Qajars, 1795-1925," accessed 30 March 2015, <http://countrystudies.us/iran/>.

Reza Shah in 1941; the mistakes made by the Qajar Dynasty that brought to power the Pahlavi family and the unification of a people. To understand the societal dynamic involved in the unification of the populace, you have to understand the events that shaped the way of thinking and understanding as a nation. Iran has a distinctive identity as a nation that differs greatly from any of the other Muslim states in the Middle East that severely affected US support and played a critical part in the Islamic Revolution.¹⁰⁵ It is imperative to comprehend the evolution of thinking that occurred during the late 18th century to understand the societal framework that existed prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Multiple key events and factors in Iranian history contributed to the necessity of US intervention and support through FID. The first factor is the Iranian national identity. The Iranian national identity is closely tied to its history that dates back to the Persian Empire. Its national identity was the basis of a social framework that shaped the revolution and directly impacted USG efforts in maintaining a US friendly regime. The Iranian national identity begins with the birth of Shiism. In the Muslim religion there exist distinct sects that represent division within the religion. Approximately 90 percent of the one billion Muslims in the world identify themselves as Sunni, and “of the remainder, most are Shiites, the largest number of whom are in Iran.”¹⁰⁶ This dynamic plays a significant role in the capacity of Iranian society to unite behind a common cause and sets the conditions for a society that was predisposed to rebellion towards a corrupt leader.

¹⁰⁵ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, preface.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

After centuries of war and invasions, Arab power receded and eventually passed to the revolutionary Safavid dynasty which drew its inspiration from Shiite beliefs. In 1501, after a series of victories won with the aid of Shiites who joined his cause from other lands, the Safavid leader Ismail proclaimed himself Shah. Upon Ismail's ascension to the throne, his first act was declaring Shiism the official national religion, this act is considered the single most important step toward creating the Iranian nation.¹⁰⁷ Iran as a nation with one common religious belief created a phenomena uncommon among other Muslim nations, a sense of unity and nationalism compounded with remembrance of its once greatness that was the Persian Empire. This was the history that defined the Iranian national identity that set the stage for the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Iranian history from 1891 to 1926 includes major events that serve as precursors to US intervention and support. The first event is the the Tobacco Revolt of 1891 under the rule of Nasir Al-Din Shah.¹⁰⁸ Nasir Al-Din Shah squandered national treasures to support his lavish lifestyle; he sold key jobs in government and imposed oppressive taxes. Most importantly, he confiscated fortunes from many wealthy merchants effectively turning the middle and upper middle class against him. In 1891, Nasir Al-Din Shah sold the rights of the Iranian Tobacco Industry to the British Imperial Tobacco company for 15,000 pounds.¹⁰⁹ This agreement required all Iranian tobacco growers to sell exclusively to the British Imperial Tobacco company; additionally, all smokers could only buy tobacco products from smoke shops that belonged to the British Imperial Tobacco retail

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 31.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 32.

network.¹¹⁰ This proved to be too great of an insult to an already disillusioned populace. It spurred resentment through all ranks of society to include the Shah's own harem of wives. It caused the creation of a coalition of intellectuals, merchants, and clerics that resulted in a Fatwa, or religious edict, to quit smoking. Word of the Fatwa spread across Iran, all obediently followed to include the wives of the Shah. This one event, the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, is the turning point in Iranian history, often compared to having the effects of the Boston Tea Party in American history.¹¹¹ It united an entire country regardless of social class against a repressive leader effectively giving the people a voice against the monarchy.

The next event is the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. In December of 1905, merchants were arrested over a dispute for the price of sugar, they were punished by the local governor and punished in the form of "bastinado, a favorite Qajar punishment in which victims were hung by their wrists and thrashed on the soles of their feet."¹¹² Huge protests erupted in the bazaar initially calling for the removal of the governor, then reduction of taxes as they noticed the power of a unified voice, and finally culminating with the calling for a parliament that would protect and defend the rights and interests of the people. Muzaffar al-Din Shah conceded with the increasing pressure of the people but decided to stall well into 1906. Once again, protests erupted of greater magnitude. Muzaffar al-Din Shah gives in and allows the people to have open elections establishing the first parliament in Iran, known as the Majlis; they hold their first session in October

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 33.

¹¹² Ibid., 34.

1906.¹¹³ The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 is considered by many historians as the equivalent of the signing of the Magna Carta in Iranian history.

The Constitutional Revolution brought forth new phenomena and principle actors to Iranian society. First, the idea of governance by representation created from the principles of democracy was a new ideal that sat well with the established middle class that consisted of progressive reformers, merchant class, and various other professionals and academics.¹¹⁴ Essentially, giving a resounding voice to the people that cannot be ignored by the monarchy. Second, it created precedence where Imam's and clerics that wielded their influence by mobilizing the masses of impoverished unites with the middle class under a common cause despite conflicting interests.¹¹⁵ This becomes critical particularly in the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that will be discussed later. Finally, it brings forth a prominent figure to Iranian politics that plays a key role in the future of Iran in the 20th century that will be discussed later as well: Mohammed Mossadegh.¹¹⁶

The unity within the Majlis eventually dissolves once progressives take form that conflict with the ideals of the clerics. The clash between clerics and secular reformers continues and resonates through modern Iranian history, particularly following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Despite efforts of the Majlis, the Shah decides to leverage

¹¹³ Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 36.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 54.

the presence of Russian troops and shuts down the Majlis effectively ending the Constitutional Revolution in 1911.¹¹⁷

Following the end of the Constitutional Revolution in 1911, instability in the country worsens. Uprisings begin to take shape in different parts of the country. In the Northern Province of Gilan, Russian influence coupled with a nationalist fervor results in a national liberation movement that represented the inability of Ahmad Shah to rule Iran.¹¹⁸ The establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran in the province of Gilan is the key event that brings to power Reza Khan and Pahlavi dynasty.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 causes a withdrawal of Russian troops from Iranian territories and loss of influence in Iran.¹¹⁹ In 1919, the British impose the Anglo-Persian Agreement on Ahmad Shah, the ruling son of Muzaffar al-Din Shah. The British effectively take control of Iran's Army, treasury, transport systems, and communications network removing the "final vestiges of Iranian sovereignty."¹²⁰ This in turn infuses the nationalist movement with a newer and more intense passion. In the Northern Province of Gilan, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, with Soviet assistance, is declared in 1920 with its principle leader as Mirza Kuchik Khan. This first attempt at breaking from British rule provided Iran with an example of a national liberation movement and a peasant-backed guerrilla force (in this case the Jangalis); and it offered a brief experiment

¹¹⁷ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, "The Constitutional Revolution."

¹¹⁸ Janet Afary, "The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran: A Critical Exploration," *Iranian Studies* 28, no. 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1995): 3, accessed 23 March 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310915>.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁰ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 40.

with socialism which ended tragically. The defeat of the Republic and subsequent death of Mirza Kuchik Khan at the hands of a British backed force solidified the domination of Iran by the British.¹²¹ The Jangal Movement and Mirza Kuchik Khan, despite such a wide range of conflicting ideology, is attributed by some Iranians as the best examples of Iranian nationalism and anti-imperialism and serves as an ideological forerunner of the Islamic Republic of 1979.¹²²

Quelling these uprisings and bringing under control the lawlessness in the countryside brings to rise another prominent leader, Reza Khan of the Pahlavi family. With the rise of the Soviet threat in the north, and the ineptness and inability to lead of Ahmad Shah, the British approach Reza Khan, an established military commander, with a proposition of replacing the government of Iran.¹²³ Reza Khan, who shared a disgust of the Qajar house as most of Iran, agrees. In February 20, 1921, Reza Khan leads two thousand men to the outskirts of Tehran; by dawn of the 21st of February 1921, he arrests the Prime Minister and his Cabinet and successfully carries out the coup without a shot fired.¹²⁴

Reza makes two demands to Ahmad Shah: 1. Sayyed Zia Tabatabai, an ex-journalist, is to be named prime minister; and 2. He himself is to command the Cossack Brigade.¹²⁵ After three months following the coup, Reza Khan dismisses Sayyed Zia as

¹²¹ Afary, "The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran," 3.

¹²² Ibid., 21-24.

¹²³ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 41.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

prime minister and names himself minister. Soon after, he persuades the Shah to travel abroad for health reasons. Reza Khan successfully expels Soviet advisors from the military ranks, consolidates power away from the Shah, and becomes the army commander and essential head of state.¹²⁶ Once the Shah refuses to return, Reza Khan reconstitutes the Majlis in a calculated political move and retires to a small village. Predicting the flow of Iranian politics, with no Shah the Majlis declares the Qajar dynasty dead and offers the throne to Reza Khan on 25 April 1926.¹²⁷ Reza Khan becomes Reza Shah, ruler of Iran.

The rise of the Pahlavi dynasty and the sequence of events that occur in the next fifty-three years following the ascent of Reza Shah to the throne bring the direct intervention and support of the USG. Despite Reza Shah self proclaiming to be a nationalist, and immediately limiting foreign influence in the country, he entwines the fate and future of both Iran and Pahlavi dynasty with that of the wants and needs of the British.¹²⁸ US intervention and subsequent aid at the request of the British shapes the future of Iran in the second half of the twentieth century.

It is in the mid-1930s that Reza Shah commits two major mistakes that seals his fate and leads to his removal from the throne. Reza Shah travels to Turkey in 1934 to meets the Turkish reformer Kemal Ataturk and tour the countryside. Depression and frustration sets in upon seeing the speed in which Turkey is progressing towards

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 42.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 42-43.

modernity and secularism.¹²⁹ This is where he commits his first mistake. Upon returning to Iran, he doubles his efforts of modernization and secularism in Iran that he began when he assumed the throne disregarding long standing social patterns and religious beliefs.¹³⁰ He alienates the entire population and turns them against him. This leads him to his second mistake.

Reza Shah became fascinated with the fascist movement that was occurring in Europe in the early and mid-1930s. He drew his inspiration from figures such as Mussolini, Franco, and Hitler in how to unite nations of differing ethnicities.¹³¹ He launches a highly oppressive campaign to erase the identity of the minority groups that lived in Iran, specifically the Azeris and Kurds. He aligns his ideals and processes to those of his inspirational figures. One of the Shah's newspapers declared, "the cardinal goal of the German nation is to attain its past glories by promoting national pride, creating hatred of foreigners, and preventing Jews and foreigners from embezzlement and treason . . . our goals are certainly the same."¹³² Just prior to the beginning of the Second World War, Germany was Iran's largest trading partner.¹³³ Once World War II breaks out, Reza Shah assumes a neutral position that greatly favors the Axis powers. Part of his neutrality, he allows Nazi agents to operate in Iran. This draws the attention of Great Britain and the Soviet Union who both maintain interests in Iran and are a part of the

¹²⁹ Ibid., 44.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid., 45.

¹³³ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, "The Era of Reza Shah."

Allied forces. Under threat of losing influence in Iran, on 25 August 1941, the British and Soviets send troops to Iran to expel German agents and maintain influence over Iran's vast resources of fossil fuels.¹³⁴ The Iranian Army immediately yields. After taking control of strategic points around the country, the Shah is forced to cut all ties with the Axis powers and allow both Soviet and British troops free access to his territory. The Shah, who alienated the greater portion of his populace, is left alone to resist the British and Soviets and eventually yields. On 16 September 1941 Reza Shah abdicates and his son, Mohammed Reza, ascends to the throne at twenty-one years of age.¹³⁵

Following the abdication of Reza Shah, Iran has its first free elections in 1943 and brings back the polarizing nationalist figure Mohammed Mossadeqh to national politics.¹³⁶ The Majlis begins to reassert itself and gain influence in the eyes of the populace.

In 1946, the deteriorating national conditions cause the situation to come to a head sparking a sequence of events that leads to the Coup of 1953 that removes Mohammed Mossadeqh from the office of Prime Minister. Violent protests erupt in Abadan, the British controlled island that has the world's largest oil refinery that is run by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.¹³⁷ As opposed to negotiating, the British organize ethnic Arabs and separatist tribesmen to actively resist the demonstrations. The bloody rioting ends with the Anglo-Iranian directors grudgingly conceding to the one request of abiding by Iranian

¹³⁴ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 45.

¹³⁵ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, "World War II and the Azerbaijan Crisis."

¹³⁶ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 61.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

labor laws. They never do abide by the laws and instead decide to flex its military power by conducting naval exercises with British warships off the coast of Abadan in full view of the resident Iranians.¹³⁸ As opposed to scaring them into submission, they instead inflame public opinion and further ruin British and Iranian relations.

In 1947, the Majlis passes bold legislation forbidding the grant of any further concessions to foreign companies and directs the government to renegotiate the existing agreements with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.¹³⁹ This legislation sets events in motion that would lead to a direct confrontation between the Majlis, and the British government owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with Mohammed Reza Shah in the middle. This bold move by the Majlis was initiated, written, and pushed through by the polarizing nationalist Mohammed Mossadegh.¹⁴⁰

Mohammed Mossadegh is an iconic figure in Iranian history that enters politics in 1906, and becomes a prominent national figure under the rule of Reza Shah. He can be identified by two central principles: a passionate faith on rule of law, and the ideal that Iranians should rule themselves.¹⁴¹ These central principles lead to placing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company directly on the sights of Mohammed Mossadegh.

With the persistent threat of violence in Abadan, and pressure from the Majlis, the British return with an agreement that came to be known as the Supplemental Agreement

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 53.

of 1949.¹⁴² It was meant to be a supplement to the original agreement made in 1933 with Reza Shah. The Supplemental Agreement guaranteed that annual royalties would not drop below 4 million pounds, a substantial reduction in territory where drilling was permitted, and a promise that more Iranians would be trained for administrative positions.¹⁴³ The situation became volatile 19 February 1951 when Mohammed Mossadegh becomes Prime Minister. Immediately upon taking office he presents legislation for the nationalization of its oil effectively ending any and all British involvement in the exploration, drilling, and refining of oil products from Iranian soil, also ending the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's holdings in Iran.¹⁴⁴ The bill officially passes and becomes law 2 May 1951. This immediately sends the British into an uproar. Any chance for negotiation had now ended, there would be no reconciliation. The situation became so volatile, that American President Harry S. Truman intervened to prevent direct military action by the British.¹⁴⁵

The move of nationalization was inevitable. Mohammed Reza Shah had no choice but to sign the legislation to nationalize the oil industry.¹⁴⁶ Popular support for nationalization was overwhelming. A popular support based on the tradition and common legacy of rebelling against corruptness according to Shiite principles, a national identity

¹⁴² Abbas Milani, *The Shah*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 144.

¹⁴³ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 68.

¹⁴⁴ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 93.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 91.

based on a common religion and a remembrance of its own greatness that was the Persian Empire, the unity across social classes against a repressive leader giving the people a voice as was first experienced in the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, the idea of governance by representation created from the principles of democracy and the precedence of the religious class uniting with the middle class against a common threat to the people as was the case of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906; these are the same fundamental principles and political sentiments that laid the framework for the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

The US did not have a policy in regards to Iran until after the Second World War.¹⁴⁷ A policy towards Iran did not come to fruition until it was sparked by the expansion of communism and the beginning of the Cold War. Up until that point, mainly Great Britain and Russia had interests in Iran.¹⁴⁸ In 1950, there existed a massive schism between British and American policy concerning Iran.¹⁴⁹ The British continued taking the stance of traditional imperialism and refused to negotiate something that they believed was rightfully theirs. The US predominantly was anti-communist and supported nationalist movements out of the necessity of denying access to the Soviets and communism.¹⁵⁰ In 1949, the British and US, along with several other nations, created an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty that came to be

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 86.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 85.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 88-89.

¹⁵⁰ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 22-23.

known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁵¹ Regarding the threat and eventual nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, the US urged and at times begged the British to soften their approach and offer a better deal that would benefit the people of Iran more so. They advised the British to heed the growing sentiment of nationalism and prepare to accept it as a norm. British refusal to compromise brings the need for intervention by the US. Once the British refused to negotiate, there was no room for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to their problem. The US decided to mediate for fear of losing an ally and potentially dissolving NATO.¹⁵² The British, realizing that any attempts to negotiate an agreement with Mossadegh was a waste had only two options, leave Mossadegh in power or organize a coup to remove him. With little thought, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill approves developing a covert plan to remove Mossadegh from office.¹⁵³

Failed negotiations and mediation continue until the end of the Truman administration. During this time the British continue planning covert operations to remove Mossadegh from office. The Truman administration continued declining support for any type of covert operations and held out for a diplomatic resolution between the British and Iran.¹⁵⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected President of the United States and assumes office 20 January 1952. With the change of administration, it brought a drastic

¹⁵¹ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 85.

¹⁵² Ibid., 99.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

increase in utilizing covert action as an instrument of national strategy.¹⁵⁵ Within a few days of the election, a senior British intelligence agent from the Secret Intelligence Service came to Washington to address the Iranian problem.¹⁵⁶ The British take a different approach with the Eisenhower administration, as opposed to arguing the recovery of its oil industry, they focus on the Soviet threat.¹⁵⁷

The protests of 21 July 1952 to reinstate Mossadegh posed a serious threat that could be capitalized on to persuade US support for covert action. The protests organized by the National Front (political party headed by Mossadegh) of 21 July 1952 were predominantly made up of three distinct groups. One group was the Mossadegh supporters who wanted to reinstate Mossadegh, they made up a few thousand.¹⁵⁸ The second very influential group was made up of followers of Ayatollah Kashani who had learned that the Ayatollah was going to be arrested by the current Prime Minister, Prime

¹⁵⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 157-158, 354. Of note, a direct correlation of foreign policy and domestic politics is made: "Newly elected administrations tend to define their view of the world, not only by an objective and dispassionate assessment of what is going on in it, but rather by a determination to distance themselves from their immediate predecessor's policies . . . Eisenhower's asymmetrical New Look arose out of his critique, during the 1952 campaign, of Truman's commitment to symmetry." This shift in foreign policy due to transition between political parties in the White House directly affected Iran during the Coup of 1953 during the transition from President Truman to President Eisenhower with the approval of covert action. The same argument can be made of the drastic effects in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 during the Carter administration that saw a huge shift in policy due in large part to the platform of human rights that ushered President Carter into office. US pressure on the Shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua to ease measures of control exposed the regime's vulnerabilities to opposition groups that contributed to the fall of each regime.

¹⁵⁶ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 3.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁵⁸ Milani, *The Shah*, 176.

Minister Qavam, the Ayatollah issued a fatwa ordering soldiers to join the rebellion.¹⁵⁹ The final group brought out the largest group, the Tudeh party, who is a pro-communist group of militants who were still angry at Qavam for orchestrating the withdrawal of the Soviets from Azerbaijan in 1947.¹⁶⁰

This new approach directly impacted two brothers who guided foreign policy within the Eisenhower administration, John Foster Dulles who became the Secretary of State, and Allen Welsh Dulles who become the Director of Central Intelligence.¹⁶¹ The fact that the rebellion against the Shah and Qavam was predominantly Tudeh militants was enough for the Eisenhower administration who took office 20 January 1953, and the Dulles brothers, to move forward with planning jointly with the British for covert action to remove Mossadegh from office; the operation is codenamed Operation AJAX.¹⁶²

In 1953, Mossadegh continues to consolidate power and influence from the Shah. He appoints himself Minister of Defense within his own cabinet, he then appoints men loyal to him as Chief of Staff of the Army, and Chief of the National Police force. The spring of 1953, he also attempts to take the authority of Commander in Chief of the military from Mohammed Reza Shah.¹⁶³ He then approached the Eisenhower administration for economic aid to further develop other resources. The official response from the White House was, “it would be unfair to the American taxpayers for the United

¹⁵⁹ Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 140.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 93.

¹⁶² Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 4.

¹⁶³ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 96.

States government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds from the sale of its oil and oil products if a reasonable settlement were reached.”¹⁶⁴ Only technical support and military assistance was offered instead.

With Iran economically isolated and close to collapse, and US economic aid no longer available, Mossadegh opens up trade talks with the Soviet Union 8 August 1953. Upon hearing the news, President Eisenhower gives final approval for the execution of Operation AJAX and the removal of Mohammed Mossadegh as Prime Minister.¹⁶⁵

Prime Minister Mossadegh is successfully removed from office by the joint US and British sponsored coup with the help of previously removed senior military officers loyal to the Shah, dejected groups that withdrew support from Mossadegh due to the economic sanctions, and the Shah himself who saw his power stripped by Mossadegh. The Shah and his men effectively consolidate power from the people and the nationalization of all natural resources gives the Shah a great deal of resources to leverage his power and increase his authoritarian rule.¹⁶⁶ There is not an election in Iran from 1953-1960 for the Majlis. Following that time frame, the Majlis is elected and run at the say of the Shah.¹⁶⁷

Nationalist sentiment never ceased, the people of Iran still desired democracy and with it a say on how they would be governed. Operation AJAX leaves the US completely

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 95.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 96.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 97.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 107.

backing the Shah and his consolidation of power to include massive increases in the country's military capabilities.¹⁶⁸ This blind support causes the US to realize the growing dissent within the population that culminates with the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Between 1953 and 1963 much poverty remained among the Iranian people despite nearly one billion US dollars in aid given to Iran by the Eisenhower administration alone.¹⁶⁹ During this time a consolidation of land occurred where the Shah himself owned a great portion of land, another prominent landowner was the Shia clerical establishment that acquired land through religious endowment.¹⁷⁰ During the 1950s and 1960s, the Shah allied himself with secularists that were in conflict with Muslims that held traditionalist values on such matters as tobacco, alcohol, movies, gambling and foreign dress.¹⁷¹ With foreign aid pouring in from the US, he increased his ties with the USG with western oil consortiums and increased military purchases from the US. In the eyes of some Iranians, the US had taken the place of the British.¹⁷²

After returning to power in 1954, the Shah launched an effort to modernize Iran economically and socially. He sought to balance his increase in power with reforms that would win more favor from common Iranians. Landlords and some clerics were outspokenly opposed to these reforms. Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious edict) against the reforms.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 97.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Frank E. Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution" (2014), 1, accessed 31 March 2015, <http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch29ir.html>.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

The movement of modernity is opposed by traditionalist clerics, in particular is Ayatollah Khomeini who by this time rose to prominence. The Ayatollah Khomeini plays an instrumental role in leading the uprising against the Shah.

In 1957, US and Israeli intelligence officers work with Iran to establish the SAVAK, an Iranian intelligence organization later blamed for the torture and execution of thousands of political prisoners and violent suppression of dissent.¹⁷⁴ According to a National Security Council analysis written in 1958, there existed a growing middle class that made up the foundation to opposition of the Shah. “Increasing numbers in these groups find Iran’s antiquated feudal structures and the privileges of the ruling classes anachronistic in a modern world.”¹⁷⁵ That compounded with the regime’s mismanagement of the economy and profound corruption caused a great deal of discontent in the middle class. Additionally, Muslim groups unite and form an underground group called the *Fedaiyan-e Islam*. The group attempted to assassinate the Shah's prime minister at the time. This event begins the methodical crackdown of radical Islamists when the Shah responds by repressing the Fedaiyan-e Islam and executing a few of its members utilizing the SAVAK.¹⁷⁶

The Shah’s paranoia increases especially following another event that occurs in 1958 that came to be known as the Gharani Affair. This was an attempted coup that was in the process of planning by the Shah’s Head of Military Intelligence Valiollah

¹⁷⁴ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 2.

¹⁷⁵ Milani, *The Shah*, 206.

¹⁷⁶ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 1.

Gharani.¹⁷⁷ The coup fails and Gharani is arrested and imprisoned for three years following discovery of the plot by the Shah. Of the seven of his top officers of intelligence and heads of the SAVAK, five were suspected of conspiring against the Shah, and two were actually found out to be planning and organizing a coup.¹⁷⁸

The year 1963 proves to be a critical year for the Shah. He carries out a plan of modernization through secularization, this agenda is carried out with what came to be known as the “White Revolution.”¹⁷⁹ The plan is an aggressive campaign of social and economic Westernization that consisted of six parts: “land reform, sale of government-owned factories to finance land reform, a new election law including women’s suffrage, the nationalization of forests, a national literacy campaign, and a plan to give workers a share of industrial profits.”¹⁸⁰ This plan is met with a great deal of opposition, primarily the clerical establishment led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Following the institution of the “White Revolution”, numerous clerics sided with Khomeini in his movement to counter the reforms and secularization of Iran. On 22 March 1963, in the city of Qom, students protesting scheduled opening of liquor stores were attacked by the Shah's paratroopers and by the SAVAK. The protests spread to the city of Tabriz, it is estimated that government forces killed hundreds of student protestors in both Qom and Tabriz.¹⁸¹ In a speech honoring the dead, Ayatollah Khomeini calls the Shah's rule tyrannical. In

¹⁷⁷ Milani, *The Shah*, 207.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 208.

¹⁷⁹ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 2.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 1.

retaliation, the government arrests Khomeini on 5 June 1963; Khomeini is eventually exiled to Iraq. Following this event, for many Iranians, Khomeini becomes known as the hero against the Shah. Khomeini's arrest causes anti-government demonstrations and rioting in a variety of cities. In response, the Shah declares martial law. Tanks and troops are deployed with orders to shoot to kill rioters. Iran's air force conducts strafing runs against columns of marchers. In two days of rioting and government retaliation, many are arrested, including twenty-eight ayatollahs. Estimates of those killed range from eighty-six which is reported by the government of Iran to upwards of ten thousand reported by an Iranian academic.¹⁸²

Memory of the events of 1963 cause the Shah to continue his repression against clerics hostile to his modernization. "In 1966 he established book censorship, with police agents raiding mosque libraries. In 1967 new laws gave women the right to apply for divorce without the husband's permission, a man had to secure his wife's consent before taking a second wife, and legal matters involving families were transferred from religious to secular courts."¹⁸³ Additionally, US aid continued pouring into Iran to purchase military supplies and equipment from 1964-1977. By 1978, Iran had the most advanced, best-trained military in the Persian Gulf with the fourth largest Air Force and fifth largest military in the world.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979," 3.

In the 1970s, Iran begins to suffer an economic decline that proves to be key preliminary events leading to the Islamic Revolution in 1979.¹⁸⁵ Despite the booming economy based on oil and aid packages from the US, most Iranians remained below the poverty line. “Agricultural output had been rising at a rate of 2.5 percent per year, but Iran's population had been increasing at 3 percent per year, and with the booming economy had come an inflation rate of from 30 to 50 percent a year.”¹⁸⁶ The economy is consistently mismanaged by the Shah and his corrupt officials. To control inflation, the Shah decides to control prices which in turn upsets merchants that make up a greater portion of the middle class. Additionally, rental rates rose 300 percent in five years, which took as much as half of a middle class family's earnings.¹⁸⁷

Urban overcrowding, inflation, corrupt leaders and electoral processes, and the increasing gap in the distribution of wealth brings three very active major revolutionary groups against the Shah: “women, students, and religious reformers.”¹⁸⁸ The main goal of women was simply to overthrow the Shah’s repressive regime, they contributed to the effort by conducting demonstrations and guerrilla activities to undermine the Shah’s authority. The students, with their wide variety of political ideologies had many grievances against the shah that included, “low college acceptance rates, poor university education, insufficient housing and conditions, and political dissatisfaction.”¹⁸⁹ This

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁸⁶ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 1.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 4.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 5.

caused a great deal of student-led protests and uprisings that had the tendency to turn violent in most major cities that had universities such as Tehran. In response, the Shah outlawed public gatherings in an attempt to stop the increasing unrest and killed many Iranian students in the process of suppressing the crowds with military and SAVAK. The ban resulted in hundreds of thousands of rebels protesting in Tehran and surrounding cities in disapproval of the ban.¹⁹⁰

As was the tradition of rebelling against corruption according to Shiite principles, a national identity based on a common religion, the unity across social classes against a repressive leader as in the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, the idea of governance by representation and the precedence of the religious class uniting with the middle class against a common threat to the people as in the Constitutional Revolution in 1906; these are the same fundamental principles and political sentiments that unite the three radical revolutionary groups just prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Once the groups unite with the religious opposition group, who were the most organized and possessed the largest numbers, the clerical establishment takes lead in the movement with Ayatollah Khomeini at the helm. The unification brought groups of a wide spectrum of Iranian society that included the middle class, former leaders of the National Front (political party once led by Mohammed Mossadegh), workers, and guerrillas.¹⁹¹ The movement now had a strong underground with more than sufficient brain trust and organization to guide the movement, a robust auxiliary to support the movement, and guerrillas to carryout aggressive tactics against the government.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

January 1977, Jimmy Carter becomes President of the United States on the platform of making human rights primary in his foreign policy agenda.¹⁹² Based on the platform of human rights, “the Carter administration suggested that if Iran did not improve its human rights record, aid, including military assistance, might be terminated.”¹⁹³ In response to President Carter’s request, the Shah releases 357 political prisoners that opposed his authoritarian rule in February 1977. The release of political prisoners and the easing of the Shah’s oppressive rule creates the perception of an opportunity for opposition forces to begin moving against the Shah. A series of organizations capitalize on the US pressure for the respect of human rights and begin actively protesting the government.

An organization of writers and publishers called for freedom of thought, and 64 lawyers called for the abolition of military tribunals. Merchants wrote letters requesting more freedom from government controls. Some people took to the streets, perhaps less fearful of being shot to death, and they clashed with police. A group of 120 lawyers joined together to publicize SAVAK torture and to monitor prison conditions. Dissident academics formed a group called the National Organization of University Teachers, and they joined students in demanding academic freedom. Political dissidents started disseminating more openly their semi-clandestine publications.¹⁹⁴

January 1978, 4,000 religious students from the Theological College in Qom demanded restoration of freedoms. Armed police responded to the demonstration with their new found freedoms caused by US pressure, demonstrators taunted the police force to shoot. The police force open fire on the demonstrators killing between 10 and 72 demonstrators.

¹⁹² Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 354. You see the shift in foreign policy referenced on footnote 116 and the subsequent effects on the regime.

¹⁹³ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 2.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

The easing of oppressive measures designed to impress the people of Iran fail to do so, instead, it allows room for opposition forces to maneuver against the Shah.¹⁹⁵ Khomeini organized a series of demonstrations of mourning for those killed. The demonstrations turned violent as disorder erupted in Tabriz, and numerous Iranian embassies abroad were attacked by Iranian students and local Communist youth groups. “In Iran, many clerics joined the protests, and 87 religious and secular leaders called on the public to stay away from work. The mood of demonstrators, principally made up of the poor, was rage. They chanted "Death to the Shah!" as they attacked liquor shops and theaters they considered inappropriate as well as banks that symbolized the rich in their perspective.”¹⁹⁶ Approximately 100 more demonstrators were killed and about 600 were injured as the rioting was suppressed.

Following the fire that was deliberately started by religiously inclined students at the Rex Cinema in Abadan that killed 410 people, the Shah declares martial law and institutes a curfew.¹⁹⁷ The Shah begins to lose control and influence over the people because of the method he used trying to maintain control.¹⁹⁸ In response he takes measures to appease the masses. He relieved some of his own people and appointed new ones to adopt policies of conciliation, eased press control, permitted open debate in the Majlis, released imprisoned clerics, closed gambling casinos, and others to gain favor in

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, “The Coming Revolution.”

¹⁹⁸ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 2.

the eyes of the public.¹⁹⁹ The measures did nothing to calm the masses. On 4 September 1978 more than 100,000 people take part in public prayers to mark the end of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month. “The ceremony became an occasion for antigovernment demonstrations that continued for the next two days, growing larger and more radical in composition and in the slogans of the participants. The government declared martial law in Tehran and eleven other cities on the night of September 7-8, 1978.”²⁰⁰ The next day, September 9, the Shah’s troops fire into a crowd of demonstrators in Jaleh Square at Tehran. The attack was supported by helicopter gunships driving out protestors from the square. The day became known as Black Friday. The government claimed there were 168 casualties; organizers of the demonstration claimed 2,000 or 3,000.²⁰¹ Following this key event, compromise between the regime and even the moderates was no longer possible; all, to include his own military, became radicalized against the Shah.

From Iraq, Khomeini continues leading the opposition group to overthrow the Shah, he orders work stoppages that end up being carried out across the nation. “Oil workers, postal employees, bank employees, journalists, mineworkers, customs officials, transportation workers all went out on strike. So too did almost all universities and high schools. There were demands for better wages, for the dissolution of SAVAK, the ending of marital law and for allowing Khomeini’s peaceful return.”²⁰² The Shah responds by applying pressure on Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraq, and manages to have Khomeini

¹⁹⁹ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, “The Coming Revolution.”

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 2.

²⁰² Ibid.

expelled from Iraq. Khomeini's arrival in Paris, France provided a new stimulus to the revolutionary movement by giving Khomeini and his movement exposure in the world press and media. It simplified and made more effective telephone and face-to-face communications between Khomeini and his lieutenants in Tehran and other Iranian cities to coordinate the opposition movement.²⁰³ The upper class of Iran, including high ranking military officers, begin moving their wealth and migrating out abroad.

Iran comes to a standstill because of continual protests and strikes. Stores, media sources, banks, and many oil industries are closed down due to widespread strikes, “the unavailability of fuel oil and freight transport and shortages of raw materials resulting from a customs strike led to the shutting down of most private sector industries in November.”²⁰⁴ The Shah continued making concessions to the opposition attempting to placate the uprising. Khomeini dismisses all attempts and calls for continued protest. On 9 and 10 December 1978, several hundred thousand persons participate in the largest anti-government demonstrations in a in Tehran and surrounding provinces to mark Moharram, the month in which Shia mourning occurs.²⁰⁵

The Shah concedes December 1978, and began exploratory talks with members of the moderate opposition who were bound to Khomeini. At the end of December, a National Front leader, Shapour Bakhtiar, agrees to form a government on the condition the shah leaves the country. He accepted a new government led by an old opponent of the dissident National Front, Shahpour Bakhtiar. On 29 December 1978, Mohammad Reza

²⁰³ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, “The Coming Revolution.”

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

consented to temporarily leave the country on a vacation.²⁰⁶ On 6 January 1979, Bakhtiar pledged to launch "a genuine social democracy" and end the corruption and abuse of the past.²⁰⁷ On 16 January 1979, the Shah and his family left for Egypt.²⁰⁸

On 1 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returns triumphantly to Iran from Paris wanting to continue the revolution.²⁰⁹ Almost immediately he removes the existing government that was last approved by the Shah. Hundreds of revolutionary committees begin filling the vacuum of governance in major cities and towns across the country. Factory workers, civil servants, white-collar employees, and students continue with demanding change and resolution of their grievances. Clerics led by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti establishes the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), with Khomeini as its leader, this political party becomes the country's leading political organization.²¹⁰

On 11 February government buildings and radio stations were seized by different revolutionary groups. Huge weapon caches were seized by these groups creating armed militias that roamed the streets and looted. The existing various factions begin competing for power. Followers of Khomeini dominated the movement by sheer size, and organization. Through Khomeini's alliances with a largely anonymous committee of clerics and civilians, his contact with local supporters, he establishes what many

²⁰⁶ Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979," 5.

²⁰⁷ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 2.

²⁰⁸ Metz, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, "The Coming Revolution."

²⁰⁹ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 3.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

recognized as the only legitimate authority in Iran.²¹¹ On 12 February, Khomeini formally takes power in Iran.²¹²

Many who merged with the clerical opposition force believed Khomeini was a means to an end. That once the Shah was removed utilizing the popularity of Khomeini, he would be put aside in favor of a social democracy led by intellectuals and more modern Iranian Shia leaders. That was a part of Khomeini's promise to the consolidated opposition which included him stepping aside to establish a social democracy.²¹³ Instead, Khomeini spends the month of March 1979 consolidating power and re-instating Islamic traditions into society:

On March 3, Khomeini announced that no judge was to be female. On March 6, he announced that women were to wear the hejab head covering. Khomeini declared that all non-Islamic forces were to be removed from the government, the military, judiciary, public and private enterprises and educational institutions. Corrupt behavior and customs were to be ended. Alcohol and gambling were to be banned and so too were nightclubs and mixed bathing. Friday noon prayer and sermons were to be the focal point of the week, and all Friday prayer leaders were to be appointed by Khomeini. Men and women were to be publicly segregated, women to enter busses through one door, men through another, each with a separate seating section. In school classrooms prayers were to become mandatory. Khomeini spoke of music corrupting youth, and he banned all music on radio and television and closed twenty-two opposition newspapers.²¹⁴

Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 April, the resolution passed through public elections with a 98 percent vote in favor.²¹⁵

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979," 7.

²¹³ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 3.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

To Khomeini and the revolution, the U.S. was to blame for the Iranian problems and revolution. The remainder of 1979 encapsulates the drastic shift in American-Iranian relations which worsened as the year progressed. The decline is attributed to six major events in 1979: “the removal of U.S. ‘containment,’ the alteration of oil policies, a change in U.S.-Iranian arms sale agreement, U.S. disapproval for Iran’s ‘lack’ of human rights, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the U.S. embargo on Iran.”²¹⁶ After Khomeini took power, he closed two US intelligence collection centers that were used for gathering information on the Soviets removing a critical post for support in the US policy of containing the spread of communism. In the process of doing so, Khomeini exposed key information to Soviets which proved to be a blows to US officials and intelligence officers.²¹⁷ Khomeini declined any western influence on Iran’s oil industry, these new policies marked a drastic economic shift for both Iran and the US. Iran began collecting more profits from its oil industry; the US was required to pay more for foreign oil which caused a domestic shift in policy to decrease reliance on foreign oil and conserve energy more efficiently.²¹⁸ To sever all ties to the US, Khomeini officially cancelled seven billion dollars worth of U.S. arms purchases forcing the US to find new markets to prevent the economy from weakening.²¹⁹ The extent of severing all ties culminates on November 4 as Iranian students seized the American embassy in Tehran and took nearly seventy U.S. citizens captive. The hostages are tortured and kept from 4 November to 21

²¹⁶ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 8.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 8-9.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 9.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

January 1981 once President Jimmy Carter left office after losing his bid for re-election.²²⁰ During the hostage crisis in 1980, the US severed all diplomatic relations with Iran. President Carter passed Executive Order No. 12170, which stated: “I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or come within the possession of control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”²²¹ Every President until present day has continued this trade embargo on Iran which have defined U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations between the two nations for the last few decades.

Khomeini proved his anti-American agenda throughout his rule. Khomeini, and his successors, have actively supported radical Islamic extremists in their quest against the US and other western nations. Two examples of Iran’s anti-American campaign are: “In 1983, Khomeini supported Shi’a Muslims who bombed western embassies in Kuwait. . . . In 1996, Iranian leaders helped train [and] supply men for the bombardment of the U.S. military housing facility in Saudi Arabia. This attack resulted in nineteen dead and over 500 wounded, 240 of whom were American military staff.”²²² The Islamic Revolution of 1979, predicated by events that occurred in 1953 with Operation AJAX, marks the greatest change in diplomatic relations between these two nations.

²²⁰ Ibid., 10.

²²¹ Ibid., 11.

²²² Ibid., 12.

Analysis

Analysis on Iran will focus on conditions that existed between 1953 (Operation AJAX) and the Islamic Revolution of 1979; the indicators will follow the chronology in which they presented themselves. The analysis will be conducted to determine which indicators of a failed state identified during chapter three were present previously to becoming a failed state. They are based on the fragile states index that evaluates twelve different indicators that cover social, economic, political, and military/security categories. Once the indicators that led to failure are evaluated and identified, an evaluation will be conducted to determine if criteria to conduct UW in that country following the collapse is feasible, acceptable, and a viable option. Iran will be evaluated comprehensively according to its UW potential following collapse, or if the prerequisite conditions existed on the ground for a successful UW campaign. This will answer if UW was a viable strategic option for the USG following the collapse of the US friendly regime.

Failed State Indicators

Analysis of which indicators existed must begin with a study of the external intervention that started in 1953 which is defined as, “when the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.”²²³ Focus will be on major foreign intervention that had drastic effects on Iranian politics, society, and economy.

There was direct intervention in Iranian politics and the economy beginning with Operation AJAX and its immediate aftermath. The Shah’s ties with the USG became

²²³ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

extremely close due to the dependence on US aid that increased following the successful removal of Mossadegh, aid that totaled nearly one billion dollars from the Eisenhower administration alone.²²⁴ The Shah established western oil consortiums and increased military purchases from the US.²²⁵ Intervention on internal affairs continued in 1957 as US and Israeli intelligence officers work with Iran to establish the SAVAK, an Iranian intelligence organization later blamed for the torture and execution of thousands of political prisoners and violent suppression of dissent.²²⁶ Intervention continues with the Shah's plan of modernization through secularization that was the "White Revolution" which was a US inspired plan to address US paranoia toward a radicalized Islam.²²⁷ The White Revolution ends up alienating traditional Islamists in the country that include the clerical establishment and devout Muslims which made up the greater portion of the poor as well as the moderate middle class.

Since the Shah's power was derived from his military might, US aid continued pouring into Iran to purchase military supplies and equipment from 1964-1977. As discussed, by 1978, Iran had the most advanced, best-trained military in the Persian Gulf with the fourth largest Air Force and fifth largest military in the world giving the Shah the power to keep the opposition at bay and maintain control in Iran.²²⁸ With the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the US on the platform of human rights in 1976, pressure

²²⁴ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 97.

²²⁵ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 1.

²²⁶ Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979," 2.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid., 3.

was put on the Shah to improve his human rights record in Iran. This causes a chain of events that some historians speculate contributed to his fall from power following the release of 357 political prisoners that opposed his authoritarian rule in February 1977.²²⁹ This drastic change in policy allows the growing opposition group room to maneuver and actively pursue the removal of the Shah.

External intervention directly impacted the other four categories of failed state indicators. Economically, which include uneven economic development as well as poverty and economic decline, Iran annually increased its oil production and sale drawing a larger percentage of revenue as a result. Agricultural output increased at a rate of 2.5 percent annually.²³⁰ Since the Shah had effectively consolidated power under himself and a very select few, only they were able to prosper from the increased revenue creating a greater disparity of income. This phenomena of uneven economic development measures the distribution of income or consumption expenditure indicating a smaller group controls a higher percentage of the income share.²³¹

Iran suffered an economic decline during the 1970s that proved to be key in contributing to the Islamic Revolution in 1979.²³² Despite the economic boom caused by increased oil production, increased agricultural output, and aid packages from the US, most Iranians remained below the poverty line. The economic boom brought with it an

²²⁹ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 2.

²³⁰ Ibid., 1.

²³¹ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

²³² Wise, "Islamic Revolution of 1979," 4.

extremely high inflation rate of from 30 to 50 percent annually.²³³ Inflation coupled with corruption and mismanagement by the Shah and his corrupt officials, directly affected the merchants, who had initially prospered from the economic upturn, and the rest of the middle class. To control inflation, the Shah decides to control prices further enraging merchants. Consequently, rental rates rose 300 percent in five years, which took as much as half of a middle class family's earnings.²³⁴ This drastic economic decline leaves the moderate middle class opposing the Shah and his policy. It pushes those below the poverty line to radicalize and organize behind the clerical opposition group leaving most of the population aggressively opposing the Shah.

Analysis combines the political and military criteria due to their inter-relational connection of functions within the state. A critical indicator that encapsulates the effectiveness of both political and military categories is the measurement of state legitimacy described as the overall measurement of government effectiveness considering levels of democracy, corruption, and political participation taking into consideration the electoral process, protests and demonstrations, power struggles, drug trade, and the illicit economy.²³⁵ State legitimacy in the eyes of the populace comes into question immediately following the removal of Mossadegh due to the popular support of Mossadegh and the process taken to remove him (Operation AJAX). In the aftermath of Operation AJAX, the Shah and his men take measures to consolidate power from the people. As discussed previously, the nationalization of all natural resources gives the

²³³ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 1.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

Shah resources, compounded with the aid received from the US, to leverage his power and increase his authoritarian rule.²³⁶

Elections in Iran are non-existent from 1953-1960 for the Majlis. Following that time frame, the Majlis is strictly approved and run by the Shah.²³⁷ Corruption and nepotism are rampant in the upper echelons of Iranian government and military. The people are left without a voice or any real representation in the elected offices of governance. The social contract between the ruler and ruled is broken leaving a substantial portion of the population alienated and dejected resulting in massive protests and demonstrations against the government. The Shah responds with a heavy hand time and time again with both the military, who is primarily funded by the US, and the SAVAK, who was sponsored by Israel and the US.

Aggressive responses by the Shah directly impacts the next indicator which assesses human rights and rule of law which directly correlates with the legitimacy of the state. “When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility.”²³⁸ This indicator assesses the status of civil liberties traditionally covered in the 1st amendment of the US Constitution to include freedom of the press, amount of religious persecution, and includes political prisoners, torture, executions, and human trafficking. The Shah’s responses utilizing the SAVAK to initial dissenters within his government and opposition groups against his government include torture and

²³⁶ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 97.

²³⁷ Ibid., 107.

²³⁸ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

execution of thousands of political prisoners and violent suppression of dissent.²³⁹ Through the decade of the 1960s, he established book censorship and regular raids on mosque libraries violating both freedom of press and religious persecution.²⁴⁰ The unification of Muslim groups against the Shah sparks a methodical crackdown of radical Islamists by repressing the underground group Fedaiyan-e Islam and executing a few of its members utilizing the SAVAK.²⁴¹ As previously discussed from various sources, in response to demonstrations and protests, the Shah utilized the military under the authority of martial law, and violently suppressed uprisings and protests resulting in thousands of civilians killed or wounded, those captured were tortured and executed.

The arrest and eventual exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, known as the hero against the Shah, as a result of the methodical crackdown of radical Islamists polarizes a greater portion of the Iranian populace.²⁴² It creates a phenomena that increases the probability of a state to fail, which is a factionalized elite which occurs, “when local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract.”²⁴³ The arrest and expelling of Khomeini created a power struggle between the national government and local leaders who aligned themselves with Khomeini. As other organizations began merging with the clerical opposition, organizations such as the National Front, the population was split with few elites of

²³⁹ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 2.

²⁴⁰ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 1.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

society who supported the Shah, and the many despondent elites who had been pushed out of prominence either by arrest or by fleeing coupled with the clerical establishment. From Iraq and eventually Paris, Khomeini effectively leads the opposition against the Shah. The Shah became isolated from the populace severely effecting the social contract. Following the fateful day of 9 September 1978 known as Black Friday where as many as 168 to ranging in the thousands of demonstrators are killed, compromise between the regime and even the moderates was no longer possible; all, to include his own military, became radicalized against the Shah.²⁴⁴ The upper class of Iran, including high ranking military officers, begin moving their wealth out of Iran and migrating abroad.

With the migration of many of the Shah's senior military officers and the radicalization of much of his military against his rule, the security apparatus that should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force is lost. The security apparatus is measured by key factors that affect the ability of legitimate military and police forces to provide security to the populace such as internal conflict, rebel activity, riots and protests, militancy, bombings, and small arms proliferation. Military coups and political prisoners which affect security in the state are also considered under this indicator. Riots and protests continued to grow in magnitude and violence. Paranoia of a coup had engulfed the Shah from the 60s until that late 70s when he was eventually ousted by revolution.²⁴⁵ Competing groups began seizing weapons and becoming militarized severely weakening the social contract. In the end, the security apparatus failed by its inability to defend the

²⁴⁴ Smitha, "The Iranian Revolution," 2.

²⁴⁵ Milani, *The Shah*, 208.

existing government when it claimed neutrality in regards to the Islamic Revolution allowing the full take-over by Khomeini of the government 12 February 1979.²⁴⁶

External intervention, economic issues, and both political and military failures had profound effects on the social framework of Iran. Of the four social indicators identified which include demographic pressures, refugees and inter-displaced personnel (IDPs), group grievances, and human flight and the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people from a particular country sometimes called brain drain; only two are strongly affected by events that occurred prior to and during the Islamic Revolution. Demographic pressures are considered pressures on the population that make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will due to natural disaster or famine.²⁴⁷ These types of pressures can also include population growth coupled with food and water scarcity that eventually leads to malnutrition en masse and an increased mortality rate, increased environmental and pollution issues, and very large disenfranchised demographic of young people. Though population issues did have some effect on the economy and vice versa, it was not substantial enough to have profound effects on the Revolution aside from providing a large disenfranchised demographic of young people to fill the ranks. There were no natural disasters or famines that negatively affected the population. The same can be said for refugees and IDPs, there were not substantial groups of IDPs or refugees that affected the Revolution.

Group grievances on the other hand had drastic effects from the onset. Group grievances are, “when tension and violence exists between groups, the state’s ability to

²⁴⁶ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 7.

²⁴⁷ Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.”²⁴⁸ The tension and violence between groups involves tension and violence between the populace and the Shah’s government. Nationalist sentiment and desire for a democracy never ceased, the people of Iran still wanted a say on how they would be governed. Modernization was opposed from the beginning by traditionalist clerics, in particular Ayatollah Khomeini who, as discussed, became the figurehead of the opposition movement. There were indications early on of grievances that existed as was indicated by a National Security Council analysis written in 1958. There existed a growing middle class that felt that the Shah’s monarchy was obsolete in a modern world.²⁴⁹

The Shah’s White Revolution, or campaign of secular modernization, caused numerous clerics to side with Khomeini in his movement to counter the reforms and secularization of Iran. Protests ensued causing a cause-and-effect chain of events that included protests followed by aggressive response by the Shah followed by more demonstrations always increasing in violence and magnitude resulting in more dead and wounded as described above.²⁵⁰ As the Shah used more aggressive tactics to quell rebellions, grievances continued to merge. The merging of groups brought a wide spectrum of Iranian society that included the middle class, former leaders of the National Front (political party once led by Mohammed Mossadegh), workers, and guerrillas under

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Milani, *The Shah*, 206.

²⁵⁰ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 1.

the influence of Khomeini with the common goal of removing the Shah despite conflicting ideologies and agendas.²⁵¹

On the other hand, human flight and the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people does not occur until after the Islamic Revolution. Human flight and emigration occurs “when there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.”²⁵²

Emigration of the educated populace, primarily from the middle class, occurs after Khomeini consolidates power and begins utilizing many of the same techniques the Shah utilized to maintain power. He institutes many Islamic traditions back into society such as women were to wear the hejab head covering; alcohol, gambling, nightclubs and mixed bathing were banned. He also banned all music on radio and television and closed twenty-two opposition newspapers.²⁵³ Khomeini declared that all non-Islamic forces were to be removed from the government, the military, judiciary, public and private enterprises and educational institutions. In the early 80s, Khomeini begins eliminating opposition to his authority through arrests, executions, and defrocking of other clerics.²⁵⁴

It is at this time that tens of thousands of Iran's moderate more secular middle class decide to flee Iran. Iranian and foreign films are either banned or heavily censored. Movie theaters were denounced as conduits of Western propaganda, and hundreds of theaters are destroyed. Special patrols were formed to monitor violations such as women

²⁵¹ Wise, “Islamic Revolution of 1979,” 5.

²⁵² Messner et al., *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10.

²⁵³ Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution,” 3.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

showing their hair or wearing lipstick.²⁵⁵ That leaves Iran with hardline Islamic radical fundamentalist running every facet of government and bureaucracy. With about half of the population in the region under twenty-five years of age, there was a severe lack of technical expertise and academic scholars. It left an environment of disenfranchised youth that demanded more militant action in behalf of advancing Islam.²⁵⁶

UW Potential

With the conclusion of the assessment and identification of indicators that existed leading to the failed state, an evaluation will be conducted to determine the UW potential in Iran following the collapse of the Shah's regime.²⁵⁷

Beginning with the first criteria, there did not exist a structure capable of undermining Khomeini and his consolidated power following his take over. All organizations that had some form of structure had aligned themselves with Khomeini to

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Criteria discussed in Chapter 3, Research Methodology, will be utilized to evaluate the UW potential that existed in each of the case studies. They include: (1) A weakened or unconsolidated governmental structure that lacks the capability to maintain power and control over the populace. Additionally, the resistance must have the inverse and possess an organized structure that can fill the void and set the conditions in order to undermine the hostile regime and challenge their ability to regain legitimacy and popular support. (2) The will of the population to bear the hardships associated with the harsh, repressive countermeasures that the hostile regime may employ. (3) Existence of favorable physical and human terrain with the capacity to protect and support a resistance. (4) The organized structure must be willing to cooperate with the US, they must have compatible objectives and ideology, and possess a capable resistance leadership. (5) Confirmation of the ability to transform into an insurgency and pass through the phases of development onto a war of movement in order to undermine and eventually overthrow an occupying power and replace it with a US friendly regime. See Chapter 3 Research Methodology.

remove the Shah or had been violently put down with arrests, executions, or fled the country. With the second criteria, the population did not possess the will to resist Khomeini's regime. Not so much the hardship aspect, but those remaining were ardent supporters of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Revolution had transpired as a widely accepted social revolution that re-arranged the social structure. Popular support for the existing regime was unanimous and overwhelming. With the third criteria, favorable terrain existed particularly in the north along the Russian border. The terrain is mountainous and out of the sphere of influence of Khomeini. The issue lied in the population which was more left leaning and inclined to side with the Soviet Union than the US. Additionally, the human terrain did not support a resistance movement against Khomeini. The fourth criteria, no resistance force existed within or outside of Iran capable of resisting the Islamic Republic and Khomeini. Very few existing groups that opposed Khomeini were willing to cooperate with the US due to the fact that the US was viewed as the meddling force that caused the Islamic Revolution. With this fact, the US and existing opposition groups had limited compatible objectives and ideology. Since none of the criteria to conduct UW were met, there was no chance to transform into an insurgency against the Islamic Republic.

Conclusion

Transition to UW following the collapse of Mohammed Reza Shah's regime was not feasible. The social revolution that transpired from the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a restructuring of the social framework back to traditional Islamic customs that had been changed over the Pahlavi dynasty from 1926 when Reza Shah took to the throne until 1979 when his son Mohammed Reza Shah was removed from the throne. This was a

popular uprising where the greater portion of the population had turned against from the Shah. US support to Iran was by way of supporting the Shah and boosting the military. As discussed, this caused an animosity towards any form of US aid. Animosity derived not only from the type of aid rendered by the US, but also the memories stemming from the coup of 1953 where Mohammed Mossadegh was removed as prime minister despite popular support. Analyzing the national identity of Iran and its roots, they possessed a keen memory of not only recent events but also a memory dating back to the cultural greatness that once was the Persian Empire. Additionally, they possessed the predisposition of rebellion against a corrupt leader based on their history and Shiite tradition. The only way to sway the Iranian populace as a whole is to have a monopoly on the interpretation of the Quran and a means to control the flow of information such as the current regime has today. A secular movement did not work for the Pahlavi dynasty, and will not work now or in the future to replace the existing regime. The risk of polarizing more of the Shiite population towards the radicalized Iranian regime was not worth the minimal potential gains for the USG following the Islamic Revolution, and now for that matter. US sponsored UW operations in Iran could be catastrophic to the fickle stability in the Middle East.

Though Iran cannot be identified as a failed state according this case study per say, the indicators of the impending collapse of the Shah's regime were apparent early on beginning with US intervention in Iranian politics without having a true appreciation of the second and third order effects it would have on the societal framework. The Shah's consolidation of power following the coup of 1953 created a focus solely on the prosperity of a small portion of the population supportive of the Shah. This immediately

brought to question state legitimacy and created a cause-and-effect chain of events that spiraled downward and culminated with the failure of the Shah's regime. The unequal economic development led to the eventual economic decline that ultimately affected the remainder of the population that carried the most influence in society, the middle class. Not enough was done to protect the middle class made up of merchants, scholars, doctors and lawyers; essentially the pillars of local communities. The lower class fell under the clerical establishment, the clerics provided hope and guidance for the despondent lower class. The clerical establishment maintained influence over the masses of the lower class; but the middle class had the brain power and understanding to carry out organized movements for drastic political change as seen in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and again in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The clerical establishment depended on the middle class to institute real political change despite conflicting ideology.

An equal distribution of national economic gains, especially safeguarding the middle class, would have prevented the greater portion of events that transpired. Safeguarding the middle class through US policy would have provided a viable option to conduct UW had the need arose to replace the Shah. They could have provided a consolidated structure to undermine the regime and maintain power and control over the populace, they would have also been capable of meeting the seven dynamics of an insurgency. Replacing Khomeini's regime, and the current regime for that matter, would be exceptionally difficult considering the emigration and existing status of the middle class within Iran; at this time, despite the repressive traditional Islamic laws, there is not enough of a middle class within Iran to counter the regime.

Cuba

The Cuba case study is an example of a failed FID effort, followed by a failed UW effort. Cuba, following the Cuban Revolution, and represents a situation where a US-sponsored FID effort in support of the Batista government failed, an anti-US communist regime took over, and the US executed various failed efforts to remove the regime from power, including a poorly planned and executed UW campaign. The Castro-Che Guevera revolutionary model served as a framework for future revolutions in Central and South America, in essence, becoming the catalyst for future nationalistic sentiment and movements across the Americas. US foreign policy in Cuba before, during, and after the revolution shaped future US policy towards other countries in Central and South America out of a fear of a repeat of what occurred in Cuba. The US provided support to the government of Cuba, more specifically to the Fulgencio Batista regime, to protect US economic interests and investments. The following case study is evaluated according to indicators of a failed state and feasibility of transitioning to UW is determined according to the aftermath following the fall of Batista to Fidel Castro. This provides data to analyze and assist in answering the primary research question—is UW a viable option when a US-sponsored regime has failed.

Historical Background

Cuban history for this case study is divided into three distinct eras: the Spanish Colonial era that was from 1492 to 1898; the republic or Cuba as a semi-autonomous nation which was from 1902 to 1959; and the revolutionary era under Fidel Castro from 1959 to today. Cuba's origin dates back to early Spanish conquest, colonization, and the slave trade during the fifteenth and sixteenth century beginning with discovery by

Christopher Columbus on 27 October 1492.²⁵⁸ Its strategic location at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico between North America, the Caribbean, and Central America elevated its significance during the race to colonize the Americas beginning in the sixteenth century; as other European economic interests increased in the Americas so did its significance up until the nineteenth century. The island of Cuba was initially utilized as an operational base for the conquest of Mexico by the Spanish; Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula lies only about 150 kilometers to the west of the island. Cuba remained under Spanish rule for four centuries being a strategic point for treasure laden ships travelling from Mexico and Central America to Spain.²⁵⁹

US policy begins to take shape in Cuba in the beginning of the nineteenth century through strategic interest in its geographic location. In 1808, Cuba transitions from a strategic stop-off for Spain in the Caribbean into the major sugar producer in the world.²⁶⁰ The growth of the US as an independent nation in the early nineteenth century, the collapse of Haiti as a sugar-producing colony as a result of the Haitian revolution against the French, and the ingenuity of Cuba's Creole business class all converged to produce a sugar revolution on the island.²⁶¹ Following the collapse of most major sugar producing colonies, Spain shifts its focus on one of its remaining colonies in the Caribbean and begins importing en masse a labor force. In less than a century, Spain

²⁵⁸ Jane Franklin, *Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History* (New York: Ocean Press, 2006), 1.

²⁵⁹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," xlvii.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

brings in over one million African slaves into the island up until 1866; slavery is not officially abolished in Cuba until 1886.²⁶² Large estates squeeze out smaller farms in favor of mass cultivation.

The sugar revolution attracts US economic interests and a desire to bring Cuba under the possession of the US under President Jefferson. Spain allows Cuban ports to open for international trade by 1818, within two years, over half of Cuba's trade is with the US.²⁶³ President James Monroe on 2 December 1823, declares the Western Hemisphere "as a U.S. sphere of influence by warning Europe not to interfere in the affairs of any of the American nations that have recently become independent."²⁶⁴ This policy becomes known as the Monroe Doctrine, the US stated while stated concurrently that they will not interfere in European affairs. From the 1830s to the 1870s, Cuba's sugar industry becomes the most mechanized in the world providing 83 percent of global sugar exports, with 40 percent of that going to the US, "part of the Triangular Trade: sugar to the United States, rum to Africa, slaves to Cuba."²⁶⁵

For the remainder of the nineteenth century, Cuba makes three attempts at independence from Spain. Cuba's First War of Independence beginning 10 October 1868 is a critical mark when plantation owner Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, accompanied by 37 other planters, proclaims the independence of Cuba in the Grito de Yara issued from his

²⁶² Aviva Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 20.

²⁶³ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 3.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 4.

plantation. “Céspedes frees and arms his slaves. Two days later the brothers Antonio and José Maceo—free blacks—join the rebel ranks. Some Dominican exiles, including Máximo Gómez, help to train the rebels, using their experience from fighting against Spain on nearby Hispaniola.”²⁶⁶ The war continues until the remaining Cuban forces surrender in May 1878 officially ending the attempt. The second attempt at independence occurs from 1879 to 1880 and is known as La Guerra Chiquita or the Little War, led by Major General Calixto García. During the 1880s US investment in Cuba increases rapidly; 83 percent of Cuban exports go to the United States, with only 6 percent to Spain. On 24 February 1895, fighting led by the Cuban Revolutionary Party breaks out in Cuba beginning what is comes to be known as the Second War of Cuban Independence. The Cuban Revolutionary Party was founded by a political theorist and revolutionary writer in 1892 who had been in and out of Cuba through exile since 1869.²⁶⁷ January 1898, the US uses rumors of imminent danger to US citizens in Cuba as reason for deploying the USS Maine to Havana. The USS Maine blows up in Havana’s harbor, killing 260 officers and crew on February 15, 1898. Spain is held responsible and provides the necessary reason to seek and gain approval from Congress for a military intervention in Cuba and to shape public opinion.²⁶⁸

On 22 April 1898, US President William McKinley declares a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba and its port at Santiago, this is an act of war according to international law. Two days later, Spain declares war on the US. The following day, 25

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 5.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 7.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 8.

April 1898, US Congress formally declares war, saying that the state of war between the United States and Spain began 21 April, the date that marks the beginning of the Spanish American War.²⁶⁹

The war ends with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898 ending the era of Spanish Colonialism in Cuba. The US emerges with control of four new territories: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. Guam and Puerto Rico ceded to the US, Filipino sovereignty is transferred to the US, and all Spanish claims to Cuba are renounced granting Cuban independence; though, the US installs a military government to pacify Cuba. As discussed in chapter one, the US emerges as a world power with overseas possessions and a new stake in international politics that would lead to playing a determining role in European affairs.²⁷⁰

During the early twentieth century, the US continued to tighten its grip on Cuba in order to maintain complete control of Cuban politics and the economy, which was largely based on the exportation of sugar. The Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity signed in 1903 guaranteed a 20 percent tariff preference for Cuban sugar entering the US. In return, Cuba granted certain US products preferential treatment, and reinforced the close commercial relations between the two countries, but it also made Cuba further dependent on a one crop economy and on the US market.²⁷¹ US companies and investors gain a monopoly of the major sectors of Cuba's economy. By 1905, 60 percent of Cuba's rural land was owned by US companies and investors along with control of 90 percent of

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 9.

²⁷¹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 34.

Cuba's tobacco trade, iron, copper and nickel mines, railroads, as well as its electricity and telephone systems.²⁷² By 1927, US investments in Cuba rose above the one billion dollar mark making the largest US investment in any Latin American country.²⁷³

During the mid-1920s, a movement of nationalism began to take hold. Following Cuban independence from Spanish Colonialism, an influx of American products and culture inundated the island and greatly influenced the identity of the populace. Through persistent US intervention, a political and social dependency developed that greatly contributed to weakening the forces of nationalism in the early part of the twentieth century. Cuba's preservation of the colonial Spanish attitude that public office was a source of personal profit lent itself to electoral fraud, the idea of viewing politics as a means for social advancement, and factional competition for the "spoils of office." The concept of Personalismo, or allegiance to a man or a group, became the only way to ensure survival in the political arena.²⁷⁴ The lack of experience in self-governance prevented the prevalence of the Spanish legacy of political and administrative malpractice. Personalismo created another phenomena that was inadvertently prolonged by US intervention, the Cuban assurance that the US would intervene to protect them from other foreign intrusion or to solve their domestic difficulties. This situation encouraged an apathetic approach to governance and resolution of internal affairs, it created a mentality which led them to seek US intervention and at times guidance for

²⁷² Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 29.

²⁷³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 4-5.

²⁷⁴ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 34.

political decisions.²⁷⁵ Additionally, another phenomena developed that further divided the nation, *españolismo*. After Cuban independence, Spaniards were guaranteed their property rights and were allowed to keep control of their commerce and retail trade. An influx of Spanish immigration to Cuba occurred with an estimated 300,000 Spaniards living in Cuba by 1934. Spanish traditions and customs remained in practice as Spaniards refused to assimilate to Cuban culture. Although Cubans were on an island, shared a common language, religion, and background, they lacked national unity and identity.²⁷⁶

Following 1925, Cuban politics brought about two important figures that would shape the conditions leading into the revolution of 1959, General Gerardo Machado Morales, and Fulgencio Batista. May of 1925, General Machado is elected President of Cuba.²⁷⁷ In 1928, President Machado institutes an economic program that cannot be completed within his four-year term, he claims that only he can carry out this program. He decides to reelect himself. On April 1928, “a packed constitutional convention granted Machado a new six-year period of power without reelection and abolished the vice presidency.”²⁷⁸ Again in November of the same year, he organizes an election where he is the only candidate and is given a new six year term that runs from 20 May 1929, to 20 May 1935. This causes an uproar that results in fervent protests and riots by an organization called the *Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria* or the Federation of University Students (FEU), one of its leaders helped found the PCC as well. This

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 35.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 12.

²⁷⁸ Suchlicki, “Historical Setting,” 40.

organization was established as a result of the inability of Cuban society to absorb all university graduates leaving a substantially educated demographic with little opportunity. Initially, they obtained a series of academic and administrative reforms, larger government subsidies, and the establishment of a University Reform Commission composed of professors, students, and alumni through organized short-lived student strikes. It was not until President Machado's self-imposed re-election that the organization begins pursuing a political agenda.²⁷⁹ As a result, President Machado temporarily closes the university, dissolves the FEU, and abolishes the University Reform Commission. Following a clash with police, a student leader of the Machado resistance is killed, this enrages the movement and inspires more violent and aggressive protests against the Machado regime. Many organizations and more radicalized splinter groups of existing organizations arise against the regime.²⁸⁰

By 1933, with Cuba in a revolutionary state, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sends Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to act as a mediator between the Machado regime and the various opposition groups in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to Cuba's political situation.²⁸¹ Ambassador Welles's mediation efforts culminated in a general strike, defection within the armed forces, and several smaller army revolts against Machado. President Machado resigns and leaves the country to eventually live in the US on 12 August 1933.²⁸² A

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 39.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 40-42.

²⁸¹ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 12.

²⁸² Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 42.

provisional government is established, Ambassador Welles and the Cuban Army appoint Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, the son of Cuba's first president during the rebellion against Spain in the 1860s, as President of the provisional government. He annulled Machado's constitutional amendments of 1928 that extended the terms of office and restored the constitution of 1901. Unfortunately, the economic depression had worsened the people's misery compounding already complex existing conditions. Looting and disorder were widespread in Havana, in rural areas, peasants took over sugar mills and threatened wealthy landowners.²⁸³

In September of 1933, conditions existing in Cuba's politics brings about drastic changes in both the political arena, and society. A disillusioned army turns against their commanders and ultimately the President and takes control of the government. This is known as the "Sergeant's Revolt."²⁸⁴ Following a "proposed reduction in pay and an order restricting their promotions, the lower echelons of the army, led by Sergeant-Stenographer Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, invited the *Directorio* to meet with them at Camp Columbia in Havana on September 4."²⁸⁵ The *Directorio* refers to the *Directorio Estudiantil Universitario* or the University Students Directorate (DEU), they were a small but active group of students organized in 1927 following the dissolution of the FEU against Machado's regime.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ Ibid., 43-44..

²⁸⁴ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 13.

²⁸⁵ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 44.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 39.

By the time the students arrived at Camp Columbia, Sergeants had taken control of the camp and had arrested many of the army officers. After discussions between Batista and DEU, they agree on the overthrow of Cespede's regime and name a five member civilian executive commission to head a provisional government. That same night, President Cespedes abdicates and hands over control of the government to the commission.

Two major dynamics arise on 4 September 1933, which marked this day as a turning point in Cuba's history. It started the institution of a military run government, and it brought Batista onto the Cuban political scene as the self-appointed chief of the armed forces. Also, the student/military convergence, two armed groups accustomed to violence, united to rule Cuba.²⁸⁷ Following Batista's promotion to Colonel, the DEU appoints Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin as provisional president.

Grau San Martin's regime is run with an intense nationalism rather than radical doctrine. Grau San Martin's government was pro-labor and opposed the predominance of foreign capital. Soon after taking office, he revokes the constitution of 1901, and demands the revocation of the Platt Amendment that is eventually revoked 29 May 1934, and dissolves the old political parties. He implements a popular reformist program to "Cubanize" the labor movement by signing the Nationalization of Labor Decree, popularly known as the "50 Percent Law." The decree called for at least half the total working force of all industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises be composed of native Cubans, and that half the total payroll be allotted to Cubans.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 45.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 46-47.

These sweeping reforms alienates many foreign businessmen to include the US. The USG never recognized Grau San Martin's regime as the legitimate government of Cuba. This complicated matters because Cuban political leaders considered US recognition as a key factor for the existence of any Cuban government. By January 1934, pressure on the regime both internal and external made it evident that it would soon collapse. On 14 January, Batista, with US support, forces President Grau's resignation. Two days later, Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as Cuba's provisional president; within five days, the US recognizes Cuba's new government.²⁸⁹

After January 1934, Batista foments his status as power broker in Cuba. To the US, he represents order and progress and is the one leader capable of maintaining order while guaranteeing a friendly posture to the US and its corporate interests in Cuba.²⁹⁰ Batista continues to run Cuba behind the scenes at the behest of the US appointing and removing presidents despite Cuban resistance to one corrupt government after another until 1940 when he is elected President of Cuba.²⁹¹ Batista's first presidency coincided with World War II, during which they provided a great deal of support to the US war effort by allowing the establishment of a variety of US military facilities in Cuba, and authorizing the sale of sugar whole harvest at rock bottom prices. In return, the US increased aid and trade relations with Cuba granting credits for agricultural development and public works in Havana.²⁹² Batista additionally legalized the Cuban Communist

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 48.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 49.

²⁹¹ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 14.

²⁹² Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 52.

Party (PCC) following the inclusion of the Soviet Union into the Allied powers against Germany. Nearing the end of World War II and his term in office, in 1944 General Batista's choice for president loses to his old rival Grau San Martín of the *Auténtico* party. Once out of office, Batista goes into a self-imposed exile in Florida.²⁹³

As Grau San Martín takes office at the end of World War II, the people of Cuba expected vast reforms as occurred during his first administration. Instead, the relative calm of the war years end and a violent era of corruption and urban violence begins. From 1944 to 1948 (Grau San Martín's administration) and 1948 to 1952 (Carlos Prío Socarras' administration also part of the *Auténtico* party), Cuba goes through an era where a system of nepotism, favoritism, and gang prevalence predominated the country. Several mafia families from Italy, US, and other major organized criminal organizations were allowed to operate freely for fear of what they could do to the government. Corruption was rampant at all levels of the two administrations, they failed to provide the country with an honest government or to diversify Cuba's one-crop economy.²⁹⁴ Politics under the *Auténtico* party from 1944 to 1952 was looked at with disdain by the Cuban people. Politics evolved into an elitist class separate from the people where those elected held allegiances to themselves and those that could help them expand their fortunes.²⁹⁵

By 1952, Batista runs for president. Sensing he has little chance of winning, he stages a coup and takes power on March 10. Soon after the successful coup, Batista suspends the Constitution, cancels the elections and becomes dictator. President Harry S.

²⁹³ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 14.

²⁹⁴ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 53.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

Truman's Administration recognizes the Batista government, and immediately sends both military and economic aid.²⁹⁶ Despite receiving substantial US support, Batista is never able to gain support domestically.

His method of taking power causes a confrontation with opposition from all levels of society. The only aspect of the government he maintained a stronghold was the military and the economy, which were both propped up by US support. Many opposition groups begin developing across the country. In order to maintain control and power, he institutes a regime of repression utilizing techniques such as censorship, closing of universities, arbitrary arrests, and selective assassinations. As Batista increases the level of violent responses towards the various opposition groups, his violent actions only served to expand the hatred of Batista's dictatorial regime.

In attempts to reconcile with opposition groups, Batista periodically released political prisoners, lifted censorship, and reopened universities. These gestures remained ineffective to decrease the animosity towards the dictatorial regime, it only served to expand the opposition over the seven years he remained in office.²⁹⁷ In a sense, during Batista's rule in the 1950s, two Cuba's existed. One was the one and half million poor who were unemployed or belonged to rural landless workers or *campesinos* who had small plots of land. The other group consisted of approximately nine hundred thousand of the wealthiest Cubans who owned 43 percent of the country's income.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 15.

²⁹⁷ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 7.

²⁹⁸ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 33.

Of the various groups that opposed Batista's dictatorship, most of Cuba's political groups did so peacefully hoping for the re-instatement of a legitimate government through a democratic election process. There were some political leaders that opposed the Batista regime with more aggressive measures such as the *Auténtico* and *Ortodoxo* leadership.²⁹⁹

Ortodoxo, or Orthodox Party, was a branch of the *Partido del Pueblo Cubano* or, Cuban People's Party (PPC) developed in 1947 by *Auténtico* leaders.³⁰⁰ The significance of the *Ortodoxo* party was they brought about a prominent figure onto the political scene, Fidel Castro. During the 1952 elections, when Batista took power, Fidel Castro was running for Congress as a member of the Orthodox Party.³⁰¹ Following the cancellation of the elections, Castro began organizing a small group of militant followers to combat the Batista regime. He plans a surprise attack on the Moncada Army Barracks in Santiago de Cuba hoping to find an army lacking discipline. He was hoping to strike a decisive blow to paralyze a military response and force Batista's resignation catapulting himself as leader of the movement.³⁰² The attack conducted 26 July 1953 represents the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. The operation ended in catastrophic failure resulting in 61 out of the 160 attackers killed and the rest captured, arrested, and sentenced to prison to include Fidel Castro.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 57.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 54.

³⁰¹ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 15.

³⁰² Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 57.

³⁰³ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 36.

This approach in attacking and trying to achieve a decisive blow comes to be known as Castro's maximalist notion in which he attempts to achieve the maximum effects with one single event. This notion becomes indicative of Castro's future approach to taking power and carrying out the revolution.³⁰⁴ Batista's regime continues despite violent opposition from all directions. Batista implements stricter, more violent measures to maintain control, rigging more elections and consolidating power.

In 1956, in one of Batista's attempts to reconcile, he releases Fidel Castro in one of the mass release of political prisoners and is exiled to Mexico with some of his followers. During that time, Castro travels to the US attempting to raise money for the revolution, and organizes his followers into the *Movimiento 26 de Julio* or the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement (M-26-7; M for movement, 26 for the day, and 7 for July), an organization named after the failed Moncada Barracks attack.³⁰⁵ While in Mexico, he plans another assault with his brother Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and 79 other revolutionaries. The plan to land in Oriente province aboard a cabin cruiser named *Granma* proves to be catastrophic; most of these guerrillas are killed. Fifteen of Castro's survivors are able to regroup and flee to the Sierra Maestra Mountains where they establish a base.³⁰⁶ There they begin working with rural revolutionaries who have been organizing insurrection inside Cuba up until this time. Additionally, they are left alone for fifteen months to re-organize and build up sufficient numbers through recruitment.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 8.

³⁰⁵ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 60.

³⁰⁶ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 9.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

In 1957, with Castro in the Sierra Maestra Mountains re-grouping, the organization M-26-7 goes through a split. Castro's group in the mountains becomes known as the *sierras* or the *barberos* (bearded ones), and the urban M-26-7 wing came to be known as the *llanos* or plains. The urban *llanos* M-26-7 wing and other opposition groups continue operating within the cities intensifying their efforts. One such group, the *Directorio Revolucionario* (DR) or Revolutionary Directorate carried out a bold attempt at the Presidential Palace to assassinate Batista on 13 March 1957. The founder of the organization is killed and most of the leadership is subsequently wiped out shortly thereafter by the police.³⁰⁸

Another incident occurred on 30 July when a leader of the urban M-26-7 wing is assassinated, causing an uprising which became a general strike across the country became supported by all anti-Batista groups. The strike fizzles out under pressure of the Batista regime. And on 5 September, a naval revolt began in the city of Cienfuegos that ultimately collapsed after a coordinated uprising was called off. As a result of these attempts, Batista increases his violent methods of repression and purges the military. These measures weaken all of the opposition groups operating in the cities that incidentally represented Castro's competition. The repressive measures cause more to turn against the government, because of the success of those measures, they eventually adapt Castro's struggle and many end up joining his ranks.³⁰⁹

Also, in February of 1957, a US journalist working for the *New York Times* brought Fidel Castro to the international scene and contributed to the *Barberos* mythical

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 11-12.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

status of the guerrilla fighter. *Times* reporter Herbert Matthews was snuck into the mountains months after the failed attempt on the *Granma* to interview Castro. His article is printed and appears on the front page of the *Times* introducing Fidel Castro as a household name in the US. “He has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections,” Matthew reported. Another *Times* reporter would later dub Matthews as ‘the man who invented Fidel.’³¹⁰

Since Batista’s coup of 1952, the US had steadily supported his regime with weapons, munition, and equipment. US sentiment began to shift with reports of Batista’s violent repressive measures utilized to maintain power. Sensing the impending fall of the regime, by the fall of 1957 the United States government began holding up shipments of weapons and munitions. An arms embargo was officially announced by the Eisenhower Administration on 14 March 1958. The declaration of the embargo was declared indicating US disapproval and withdrawal of support for the regime. This had drastic effects on an already declining morale of the Batista regime and of the armed forces specifically.³¹¹ This events had profound ramifications on Batista’s offensive operations conducted in the mountains to destroy Castro and his rebels in the summer of 1958. The rebel counteroffensive led by Castro proved to be unstoppable. Though Batista’s forces were well equipped, they were poorly trained and lacked in motivation. As 1958 drew to a close, rebels continued to take city after city with little resistance offered by Batista’s forces.³¹²

³¹⁰ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 40.

³¹¹ Suchlicki, “Historical Setting,” 63.

³¹² Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 40.

The final rebel offensive was launched November 1958 when Castro's guerrilla forces numbered around one thousand fighters. After capturing numerous villages and cutting lines of communication, the rebels launch a two prong attack. Che Guevara's fighters attacked Cuba's fourth largest city Santa Clara on 29 December 1958. The city falls concurrently as Fidel Castro's fighters enter Santiago de Cuba and seize the Moncada Army Barracks without firing a shot as five thousand soldiers surrender on 1 January 1959. Upon hearing of Santa Clara's fall Batista flees to the Dominican Republic in the early morning hours. Fidel Castro and the main body of the revolutionary army enter Havana on January 8 after marching across the country. Castro's ranks swell during the operations that led to the fall of the Batista regime, but his numbers never go above three thousand fighters.³¹³

With the collapse of the Batista regime and his subsequent escape, a power vacuum remained. The M-26-7 organization was the only logical option to assume power. With Castro's charisma and his revolutionary prestige in the eyes of the Cuban people, he was the logical choice to fill the position as leader of the country. Castro did not initially take up an official position aside from commander of the armed forces. However, by mid-February, Castro becomes Prime Minister; and by July 1959 Castro replaced the existing President and appoints Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado as President. Torrado remains President until 1979.³¹⁴ Castro became the only power broker in Cuba.

Castro's formal assumption of power initiated a period where he institutes drastic changes based on the maximalist notion that defined his ascension to power, decisive

³¹³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 15-16.

³¹⁴ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 64-65.

change immediately with singular changes. The fundamentals of the change he implements stems from two key aspects inspired while in the mountains: the need for a redistribution of resources that focused on the countryside, and the need for nation-building and rise of consciousness.³¹⁵ Castro implements the most drastic changes in the first two years in power.

On 17 March 1960, amidst improving Cuban relations with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower approves a covert UW plan to train and equip Cuban exiles to invade the island of Cuba and overthrow the Castro government.³¹⁶ This support to an insurgency, made up of expats, is doctrinally UW. However, unlike most UW campaign, the USG is trying to kick start a larger movement against the Casto regime.

During the 1960s, the situation escalates to economic warfare between the US and Cuba. Cuba blames the US for multiple bombing runs and destruction of hundreds of tons of sugar cane fields and sugar mills. With every sanction the US implemented, Cuba nationalized US assets within its borders.³¹⁷ By 3 January 1961, the US breaks all diplomatic relations with Cuba and arranges for the Swiss Embassy in Havana to assume its representation in Cuba. The same services are provided for Cuba by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington.³¹⁸ As US President John F. Kennedy takes office, relations further deteriorate.

³¹⁵ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 39.

³¹⁶ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 31.

³¹⁷ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 23-33.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

On 5 April 1961, after a great deal of debate, he approves the covert UW operation that had been planned by the CIA initiated during the Eisenhower administration. The UW operation commences on 17 April 1961 with a primary objective, and a secondary objective. The primary objective is set off an uprising against Castro that result in a rapid overthrow. The secondary objective if the first failed was to gain enough territory to bring to shore the government in exile, and then call for US assistance in a civil war against the Castro regime. The plan was designed to appear as a Cuban exile affair that involved no US involvement.³¹⁹

The CIA's invasion force, Brigade 2506 of some 1,200 men, invades at Playa Girón (Girón Beach) on the Bahía de Cochones (Bay of Pigs). (In Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion is known as the Battle of Girón.) The invaders are led and commanded by CIA agent Grayston (Gray) Lynch and CIA operative William (Rip) Robertson. Within minutes of the landing, Prime Minister Castro calls a national alert. All militia are put on war footing. In the early morning, two of the U.S.-furnished ships, the Houston and the Río Escondido, carrying invaders and supplies, are sunk by propeller-driven Cuban planes. The internal support anticipated by the CIA fails to materialize.³²⁰

The plan failed drastically with over one-thousand one-hundred men surrendering.³²¹ The Bay of Pigs invasion increased Castro's popularity in Cuba and throughout Latin America, and accelerated Cuban-Soviet relations.³²² The revolution in foreign policy was completed when the US and the Soviet Union nearly went to nuclear war following the Cuban missile crisis in which Cuba allowed the Soviet Union to position nuclear missiles

³¹⁹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 32.

³²⁰ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 40.

³²¹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 33.

³²² Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 71.

on Cuban soil. After a great deal of tension, the US agreed not to invade Cuba for the removal of the Soviet missiles.³²³

The Cuban Revolution inspired a new term called *fidelismo*, or an attitude that revolution should be pursued immediately, stemming from Castro's maximalist notion.³²⁴ This *fidelismo* caused a dramatic increase in the demand for revolutionary change within their respective countries which only served to destabilize already fickle political situations in those countries. This concept caused several Latin American countries to collapse to revolutions in the 1960s.³²⁵

The results of the Cuban Revolution and *fidelismo* had drastic effects on US foreign policy and economic interests. US possessed a great deal of economic interests in many of the countries affected by the Revolution in Latin America. Its approach to dealing with Castro and Cuba negatively impacted relations with many of the countries and reshaped the local consciousness and understanding of Latin Americans on what the US represented. These issues remain in contention today.

Analysis

Analysis on Cuba will focus on conditions that existed following the Spanish American War in 1898 and the Cuban Revolution that culminated 1 January 1959. The indicators will follow the chronology in which they presented themselves. The analysis will be conducted to determine which indicators of a failed state identified in chapter

³²³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 33-34.

³²⁴ Ibid., 39.

³²⁵ Ibid., 42.

three contributed to becoming a failed state. They are based on the fragile states index that evaluates twelve different indicators that cover social, economic, political, and military/security categories. Once the indicators that led to failure are evaluated and identified, an evaluation will be conducted to determine if criteria to conduct UW in that country following the collapse is feasible, acceptable, and a viable option. Cuba will be evaluated comprehensively according to its UW potential following collapse, or if the prerequisite conditions existed on the ground for a successful UW campaign. This will answer if UW was a viable strategic option for the USG following the collapse of the US friendly regime.

Failed State Indicators

Analysis on Cuba will begin with external intervention in which the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations. Looking at the case of Cuba, Cuba did not have the opportunity to conduct its own international or domestic policies until its independence. External intervention existed on the island from its colonization by Spain up until its independence following the Spanish American War. After independence, US intervention replaced Spanish influence on the island. US intervention had drastic effects on Cuban politics, society, and most of all the economy. Prior to the Spanish American War, the US only maintained economic interests in Cuba, because officially, it was a colony of Spain.

US intervention truly began at the onset of the Spanish American War. Cuba at the time was experiencing a great deal of unrest with two previous attempts at independence. On the third attempt, the US uses rumors of imminent danger to US citizens in Cuba as reason for deploying the USS Maine to Havana in January of 1898.

On 22 April 1898, US President William McKinley declares a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba and its port at Santiago, two days later, Spain declares war on the US. The following day, 25 April 1898, US Congress formally declares war.³²⁶ This is the first military intervention by the US. The war ends with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898 ending the era of Spanish Colonialism in Cuba, but US military occupation continues for an additional four years. In 1901, US intervention intensifies by the addition of the Platt Amendment which limited Cuba's right to conduct its own foreign policy and economic policy. US military occupation does not end until the amendment is included into the newly written Cuban constitution.³²⁷ The next military intervention occurs August of 1906, when President Estrada requests US military intervention to put down an insurrection. The US intervenes initially with US Marines deployed for a second occupation, then further intervenes by forcing the President's resignation, and finally by establishing a US run provisional government which remains for two additional years.³²⁸ This type of US military intervention to assist in putting down social uprisings against the political establishment occurs many times in the first quarter of the twentieth century such as in 1912, 1917, and 1924.

Each US intervention included a military occupation that remained for different durations. It was not until 1933 that another US intervention occurs, this is simply a political intervention when President Roosevelt sends Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles as Ambassador to act as a mediator between the Machado regime and the

³²⁶ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 8.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

various opposition groups.³²⁹ The outcome following US appointment of a President is not as desired. The coup known as the “Sergeant’s Revolt” removes President Cespedes and allows the *Directorio* to take control and establish a government by commission as discussed previously. This government and subsequent Grau San Martín administration was the first government in Cuban history established without external approval, and it is never recognized by the US. This administration implemented sweeping reforms that alienated many US businessmen forcing the US to intervene on behalf of establishing a more US friendly regime.³³⁰ This is where US diplomat Ambassador Welles enlists the assistance of Fulgencio Batista to establish US friendly governments fomenting his status as the power broker of Cuba from 1934 to 1944, and 1952 to 1959 with ardent US support.

US economic interests, as mentioned, begins prior to the Spanish American War. Those interests lead to direct economic intervention with the Pratt Amendment solidifying US control of Cuban politics.³³¹ The Pratt Amendment is then followed up with the signing of the Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity in March of 1903 giving the US complete control of the Cuban market.³³² By 1905, 60 percent of Cuba’s rural land was owned by US companies and investors along with control of 90 percent of Cuba’s tobacco trade, iron, copper and nickel mines, railroads, as well as its electricity and

³²⁹ Suchlicki, “Historical Setting,” 42.

³³⁰ Ibid., 48.

³³¹ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 9.

³³² Ibid., 10.

telephone systems.³³³ In January of 1923, the US J.P. Morgan and Company agrees to loan \$50 million to Cuba, reinforcing a debt dependency that would last until the revolution of 1959.³³⁴ By 1927, US investments in Cuba is the largest investment in any Latin American country with over 1 billion dollars of investments.³³⁵

External intervention and the monopolization of the Cuban economy, compounded by the concept of *Personalismo*, or allegiance to a man or a group that became extremely prevalent in Cuban politics, contributed greatly to a vast uneven economic development, poverty, and eventual economic decline. The indicator of uneven economic development measures a country's distribution of wealth throughout the societal structure. Cuba's economy was based on a single crop export. By the turn of the twentieth century, Cuba was the top sugar exporter in the world. This made the economy extremely commercially dependent on importation of other goods and external investments. A process of centralization created large sugar estates that squeezed out smaller farms, this dynamic restrained the growth of the rural middle class, and it created an agrarian working class of poor whites and mulattoes that numbered approximately six hundred thousand in the 1950s. These landless rural workers outnumbered the small poor farmers by nearly three to one. This migratory rural proletariat essentially worked the sugar cultivation and harvest cycles which equated to four or five months of steady employment. For the remainder of the year they looked for work on road maintenance

³³³ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 29.

³³⁴ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 11.

³³⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 4-5.

and public works jobs that could only employ a small percentage of the bulk.³³⁶ Of the rural poor that were pushed out by larger estates, they migrated to urban centers. Unfortunately, Cuba's limited infrastructure only catered to the wealthy and the small middle class.³³⁷ During Batista's rule in the 1950s, US economic intervention had the effect of essentially establishing two Cubas, the one and half million poor and approximately nine hundred thousand of the wealthiest Cubans who owned 43 percent of the country's income.³³⁸ As the poor struggled with subsistence living, the rich lived lavish lifestyles often taking shopping trips to Miami. Poverty remained rampant from the Spanish American War until the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

Cuba suffers an economic decline as many other nations around the globe during the Great Depression. The depression and ensuing economic decline causes unrest in most urban centers by the late 1920s and early 1930s. Looting and disorder were widespread in Havana, in rural areas, the proletariat peasants took over sugar mills and threatened wealthy landowners.³³⁹ The depression also causes the government to propose a military reduction in pay and issue an order of restricting promotions. This ordeal eventually leads to the "Sergeant's Revolt", which was the government takeover by a lower enlisted group led by Fulgencio Batista.³⁴⁰ Economic conditions only contributed to the instability of an already delicate political situation.

³³⁶ Ibid., 5.

³³⁷ Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 26.

³³⁸ Ibid., 33.

³³⁹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 43-44.

³⁴⁰ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 13.

External intervention had profound effects on the political framework of Cuba bringing to question state legitimacy from the onset of governance, this is a critical indicator that encapsulates the effectiveness of both political and military categories measuring levels of democracy, corruption, and political participation taking into consideration the electoral process, protests and demonstrations, power struggles, drug trade, and the illicit economy. Every single US military intervention in the first quarter of the twentieth century was to assist in putting down an anti-government uprising. Again, the concept of *Personalismo* within politics lent itself to corruption, nepotism, and an uneven distribution of power and influence. Additionally, from the onset, a tendency to solve differences between opposition groups and the sitting regimes with violent repression, and usually with US assistance, develops from the first government of President Estrada in 1906.³⁴¹ With the establishment of military governments following the coup of 1933, they were incapable of solving Cuba's most pressing problems: "overdependence on a single crop (sugar), political and economic subordination to the [US], and grinding poverty and inequality."³⁴² The situation worsens under the Autentico's time in office from 1944 to 1952 as Cuba goes through an era of corruption, urban violence, nepotism, favoritism, and gang prevalence. Corruption was rampant at all levels of the two administrations, they failed to provide the country with an honest government allowing Batista to take power in 1952 virtually unopposed.³⁴³ Politics by this time evolved into an elitist class where those elected focused on expanding their

³⁴¹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 36.

³⁴² Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 33.

³⁴³ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 53.

fortunes.³⁴⁴ Violence by the regime only intensifies at putting down opposition to his rule.

Each regime from President Estrada to Batista used violence and repression as a means to retain power and order. At the expense of any state legitimacy, Cuban governments historically violated human rights and rule of law, a political indicator that encapsulates the civil liberties covered in the 1st amendment of the US Constitution and includes political prisoners, torture, executions, and human trafficking. Each regime resorted to imprisonment, torture, executions, and exile of political figures that opposed the regime especially after the establishment of military governments in 1933. The fact that many of these regimes carried out these oppressive measures with US support affected USG legitimacy in the eyes of the Cuban populace as well.

It became a norm for the Cuban populace to view the military solely as a faction that protects the corrupt government and its political figures, as has been discussed, and to view politicians as servants of the US government. This creates a dynamic that simultaneously negatively impacts three indicators which are the security apparatus, factionalized elite, and lack of public services. The military and police did not fulfill its traditional purpose of protecting the populace, instead they became the tool of oppression and coups. This dynamic results in a fractured security apparatus and a factionalized elite. The violent repression of opposition groups by the military produces further animosity towards the government and radicalizes every facet of society not a part of the regime in power further factionalizing the elite. This dynamic repeats and intensifies as power transitions from regime to regime and culminates with Batista in the 1950s that results

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 55.

with the Cuban Revolution, and the taking of power mostly unopposed by Fidel Castro and his followers. There were never sufficient public services to protect and provide for all of the population due to dedication of a great deal of resources to protect each regime's monopoly of power.

Intervention, corruption, and lack of a social contract between the government and the people all contributed to severe social upheaval affecting each of the social indicators that include demographic pressures, refugees and inter-displaced personnel (IDPs), group grievance, and human flight and the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people. Group grievances existed from the first government established and usually expressed themselves in the form of protests and uprising against each of the governments. Group grievances for the most part resulted from immense lack of self-determination, poverty, and disenfranchisement stemming from corruption, unequal economic distribution, and electoral fraud. Their existed demographic pressures as a result of large disenfranchised groups of youth specifically college graduates that the Cuban infrastructure lacked the capacity to absorb, so instead they became radicalized and vehemently opposed the US sponsored government establishments. Though Cuba did not have substantial refugees, they did have large groups of inter-displaced personnel that were made up of mostly the rural proletariat and poor farmers that lost their lands to larger estates. They migrated to urban centers and found themselves in worse situations at times.

After each of the uprisings, there was some form of emigration to flee the oppressive government. The main emigration of highly trained or intelligent people that took place occurs after Fidel Castro took power and rapidly instituted radical reforms.

Castro's revolutionary intentions forces the upper and most of the middle class to emigrate. Numbers of those emigrated reached six hundred thousand by 1974, approximately a tenth of Cuba's population in 1958.³⁴⁵ Though, sufficient revolutionary intellectuals and bureaucrats remained to conduct the functions of a government. The only effect this emigration had was that it left behind mostly ardent revolutionary Castro supporters with little opposition.

UW Potential

With the conclusion of the assessment and identification of indicators that existed leading to the failed regime and the taking of power by Fidel Castro, an evaluation will be conducted to determine the UW potential in Cuba following the collapse of the Batista's regime. This case study will now determine if the same physical and human environmental conditions exist following the collapse of the regime just as it should when conducting UW in a nation the US has not supported, the same criteria utilized in the Iranian case study will be utilized in this case study.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 28.

³⁴⁶ Criteria utilized include: (1) A weakened or unconsolidated governmental structure that lacks the capability to maintain power and control over the populace. Additionally, the resistance must have the inverse and possess an organized structure that can fill the void and set the conditions in order to undermine the hostile regime and challenge their ability to regain legitimacy and popular support. (2) The will of the population to bear the hardships associated with the harsh, repressive countermeasures that the hostile regime may employ. (3) Existence of favorable physical and human terrain with the capacity to protect and support a resistance. (4) The organized structure must be willing to cooperate with the US, they must have compatible objectives and ideology, and possess a capable resistance leadership. (5) Confirmation of the ability to transform into an insurgency and pass through the phases of development onto a war of movement in order to undermine and eventually overthrow an occupying power and replace it with a US friendly regime. See Chapter 3 "Research Methodology."

Beginning with the first criteria of whether a weakend or unconsolidated structure that could maintain power and control over the populace existed in Cuba and the inverse of resistance following the fall of the Batista regime. No, there was not an organization or group sufficient to undermine Castro's movement and maintain power and control over the populace. Immediately following the fall of the Batista regime there existed some structure of anti-Batista groups and political parties that were not entirely in line with Castro's movement.³⁴⁷ Even within the M-26-7 organization, there existed enough of a schism to infiltrate weakening the existing Castro regime following the collapse of Batista.³⁴⁸ Unfortunately, they did not have the popular support that Fidel Castro had following his march into Havana. Castro's popular support only grew as he consolidated power and instituted drastic reforms in support of the poor solidifying his authority.

With the second criteria, the population in Cuba did not possess the will or capacity to resist Castro's regime. It was a popular movement to remove a very unpopular figure. From the perspective of the USG, all legitimacy within Cuba fell with Batista. All remaining groups and political parties were ardent anti-Batistas, and by the relation of US support to Batista, were ardent anti-American revolutionaries. The population did not have the will to resist Castro because they had been indoctrinated to embrace anti-American and anti-Batista sentiment. The correlation of Batista and the US were deeply implanted in the Cuban psyche.

In regards to the third criteria, there was more than sufficient terrain available to support a resistance. Unfortunately, it is the same terrain utilized by Castro to mount his

³⁴⁷ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 64-65.

³⁴⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 11-12.

resistance, the Sierra Maestra Mountains.³⁴⁹ He and his followers knew those mountains extremely well and could effectively conduct counter-insurgency operations.

Additionally, Castro had an intimate connection with the rural population from that region that he established over the fifteen months he was in hiding. This limited both the physical and human terrain.

The fourth criteria of identifying a resistance force, a substantial resistance force existed outside of Cuba with the Cuban exiles. The same Cuban exiles utilized during the Bay of Pigs Operation. As was assessed and the reason for their selection, they possessed capable leadership with its own identity, they had objectives and ideology compatible with the US, and they were willing to work with the US as they did.³⁵⁰ Unfortunately, they did not have the support of the local populace within Cuba to be able to meet the fifth criteria of being able to transition to an insurgency. That group, for the same reasons that inhibited them from sparking a large scale anti-Castro movement in 1961, did not have an ideology and objectives that were appealing to the Cuban people that remained in Cuba, primarily the poor masses that were benefiting greatly from Castro's reforms.³⁵¹ This severely affected their ability to transition to a war of movement.

Conclusion

US intervention in Cuban economics, politics, and society directly prevented the feasibility of transition to UW following the collapse of the Batista regime. The political

³⁴⁹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 9.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 32.

³⁵¹ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 40.

revolution that caused the social revolution several years after the fall of the Batista regime, was a process of eliminating any and all US intervention in Cuba. According to analysis of historical data discussed, the Cuban Revolution did not begin as a popular uprising against US influence but more so a popular uprising against the Batista regime.

US support at the critical point following the 1952 coup that returned Batista to power and the action-counteraction chain of events that occurred in the first two years of Castro's regime caused popular support to turn completely against any type of US aid or intervention radicalizing the remaining population against US interests.³⁵² If the US would have broken ties with the Batista regime in 1952 and reinforced the electoral process, Cuban-US relations would have continued and probably strengthened because the local populace would have seen the US as supporting the general population of Cuba as opposed to a select few. It would have undermined Castro's efforts at toppling the Batista regime, a movement that did not become a popular movement until well after the initial attack on the Moncada Barrack in 1953. Arguably the movement did not become the popular movement it came to be remembered for until after he took power January 8, 1959 with his campaign of romanticizing the guerrilla persona that existed in the mountains.³⁵³

The Bay of Pigs operation was an attempt at a UW operation in Cuba, its failures can be attributed to its lack of understanding of conditions that existed in Cuba following the rapid political and social change that occurred in the first two years.³⁵⁴ Cuban exiles

³⁵² Ibid., 15, 63.

³⁵³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 15-16.

³⁵⁴ Franklin, *Cuba and the United States*, 40.

did not have objectives or ideology that appealed to the Cuban population in Cuba. The operation would have been successful if it would have been a whole of government approach. Limited aid provided to Brigade 2506 during actual execution for the sake of not seeming as a US invasion proved catastrophic.³⁵⁵

A UW campaign should be an all or nothing approach from the policy perspective in order to ensure success. For this reason it is imperative to determine if a UW campaign is not only feasible, but appropriate in respects to the characteristics of the resistance movement, political climate in the US, and geopolitical situation in the region and the world. This was not considered to the extent necessary by the USG during the Bay of Pigs operation in the attempt to fabricate a war of movement rather than foster one within the country.³⁵⁶ Any chance of reinstituting US-Cuban relations ended with Soviet intervention.³⁵⁷ The risk of all-out war with the Soviet Union and Cuba existed in conducting a UW campaign in Cuba following the Bay of Pigs.³⁵⁸ The risk of war with the Soviet Union and Cuba far outweighed the potential economic gains if won.

Cuba was on the path of becoming a failed state due to US pressure, though, Soviet intervention prevented the collapse of the Castro regime and descent into a failed state.³⁵⁹ Indicators of the impending collapse of the Batista regime and eventual end of US influence in Cuba were present from the Spanish American War until the fall of the

³⁵⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 32.

³⁵⁶ Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, 34.

³⁵⁷ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 71.

³⁵⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 33-34.

³⁵⁹ Suchlicki, "Historical Setting," 71.

Batista regime. Cuba lacked state legitimacy in the eyes of the populace from the first governmental administration established in 1902. That perspective remained through the first quarter of the twentieth century, and continued after 1934 when Batista became the conduit of the US to implement US friendly regimes.³⁶⁰

External intervention and the issue of state legitimacy permeated the other political, economic, and social indicators for the failed regime. US policy should not have been completely based on US economic interests. A focus on stability and equal economic distribution to include arable land would have benefited US popular support and decreased friction between the populace and US friendly regimes. US aid directed to develop sufficient infrastructure to support the populace and provide opportunities for the educated young adults. Most importantly, developing sufficient opportunity for the growth of the middle class that was an extremely small portion and continued to shrink under the Castro regime.

Investment in the middle class would have assisted in diversifying the Cuban economy promoting stability and enduring relations with the US. Establishing support, or at least moderation, in the masses of educated young adults and the middle class would have provided potential for access to sufficiently capable groups to organize a resistance. Targeting specific groups within the populace that has the potential or predisposition to organize and resist an establishment is critical when indicators signify an imminent fall of a US friendly regime. This targeting with support should have been done in conjunction with breaking ties with the Batista regime following the coup of 1952.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 49.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua as a case study provides an interesting perspective of US policy following the Cuban Revolution. This country provides a case study on FID, the transition, and a long-term UW effort to support the Contras against the Sandanista regime. Nicaragua, after the revolution, represents a situation where US policy integrates a whole-of-government approach towards the hostile regime in place that forces moderation and eventual shift in power through the electoral process. It provides an interesting perspective of the US approach with UW regarding the US sponsored insurgency force operating in Nicaragua following revolution, diplomatic pressure, and eventual reconciliation with the regime that is elected. Although the UW effort failed in the long-run, it shows the potential for UW if the right conditions exist—which should be determined prior to executing the UW campaign.

Historical Background

US interest in Nicaragua stems from the US policy of Manifest Destiny that affected most other Latin American countries, to include Cuba, in the mid-nineteenth century.³⁶¹ Frequently in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as in Cuba,

³⁶¹ William E. LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1979), II, accessed 9 March 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/32967/william-m-leogrande/the-revolution-in-nicaragua-another-cuba>.

Nicaraguan politicians called on the US to settle domestic disputes.³⁶² A contingent of US Marines remained in Nicaragua almost continually from 1912 until 1933.³⁶³

In 1916, the US Senate ratified a treaty between Nicaragua and the US called the Chamorro- Bryan Treaty. This treaty gave the US exclusive rights to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean across Nicaragua.³⁶⁴ Though, the US had already built the Panama Canal that was finished in 1914, the terms of the Chamorro- Bryan Treaty served the primary purpose of securing US interests against potential foreign countries from building another canal in Central America.³⁶⁵

The Marines leave Nicaragua in August 1925 following elections.³⁶⁶ After political unrest between opposing political parties the US deploys Marines, who landed on the Caribbean coast in May 1926, to prevent conservative-liberal violence and prevent a revolution. The US contingent, along with Henry L. Stimson who arrives on April 1927, the mediate the civil war and reach an agreement between General José María Moncada, the leader of the liberal rebels, and the government.³⁶⁷ This agreement was known as the Pact of Espino Negro. A rebel liberal group, under the leadership of

³⁶² Tim Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993), "Foreign Intervention," accessed 8 April 2015, <http://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/>.

³⁶³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 166.

³⁶⁴ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "United States Intervention, 1909-33."

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

Augusto César Sandino, refuses to sign the Pact. Sandino was highly mistrustful of Moncada and his rebels, he conducted unilateral hit-and-run operations against conservative forces independently of Moncada's liberal army prior to the Pact.³⁶⁸

Augusto César Sandino, a general of the Liberal Party, denounces US intervention and reorganizes his forces as the Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua (EDSN) or the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan Sovereignty.³⁶⁹ Sandino continues to fight a guerrilla war against the Marines for nearly six years achieving international stature as a nationalist and anti-imperialist. The US withdraws its military contingent in January 1933 under the banner of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighborism, leaving the task stability to the American-trained National Guard under the command of Anastasio Somoza García.³⁷⁰

As the last of the US Marines leave Nicaragua, Sandino ceases fighting and agrees to peace talks with liberal President Juan Bautista Sacasa.³⁷¹ During the talks, Sandino demands the dissolution of the National Guard claiming it is unconstitutional because of its ties to the US military. On 21 February 1934, after a dinner with President Sacasa at the presidential palace, Sandino and two of his generals were arrested by the National Guard and assassinated under Somoza's orders.³⁷² After Sandino and his

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" II.

³⁷¹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "United States Intervention, 1909-33."

³⁷² LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" II.

general's executions, "the National Guard launched a ruthless campaign against Sandino's supporters. In less than a month, Sandino's army was totally destroyed."³⁷³

In 1936, Somoza forces the resignation of the unpopular President Sacasa.³⁷⁴ He brings together the National Guard and the Partido Liberal (PL) or the Liberal Party, along with the establishment of the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) or the Liberal Nationalist Party to support his presidential candidacy for the elections of 1936.³⁷⁵ He is elected president on the December elections by the margin of 107,201 votes to 108.³⁷⁶ Once in office, he resumes control of the National Guard (had resigned post according to Nicaraguan law to run for the presidency), combining the roles of president and chief director of the military. He then establishes a dynastic military dictatorship that leaves his family ruling Nicaragua for forty-three years.³⁷⁷

Anastasio Somoza García controlled political power, directly as president or indirectly through carefully chosen puppet presidents, from 1936 until his assassination in 1956.³⁷⁸ Somoza was an opportunist who maintained a monopoly of power within Nicaragua. He derived his power from three main sources: "the ownership or control of

³⁷³ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "United States Intervention, 1909-33."

³⁷⁴ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" II.

³⁷⁵ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "United States Intervention, 1909-33."

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" II.

³⁷⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 167.

large portions of the Nicaraguan economy, the military support of the National Guard, and his acceptance and support from the United States.”³⁷⁹

The Somoza dynasty started with a consolidation of power and dividing his political opponents. He consolidated his power within the National Guard, legislative and judicial systems by appointing family or close family friends monopolizing power in a very tight knit circle.³⁸⁰ Nominal opposition was allowed as long as they did not pose a threat to the regime, serious political opposition and antigovernment demonstrations were violently repressed by the National Guard.³⁸¹ Somoza controlled most government-owned enterprises to include the national radio and telegraph networks, the postal and immigration services, health services, the internal revenue service, and the national railroads by leveraging the National Guard.³⁸²

During World War II, Somoza opportunistically provided support to the Allied effort providing raw materials in return receiving much needed economic aid by integrating the Nicaraguan economy into the economic plan and receives large amount of military aid.³⁸³ With more than 90 percent of all exports going to the US, the growth in trade also increased the country's economic and political dependence.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “The Somoza Era, 1936-74.”

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

Additionally, Somoza was able to amass an immense private fortune during the 1940s. The Somoza family owned, “textile companies, sugar mills, rum distilleries, the merchant marine lines, the national Nicaraguan Airlines (Líneas Aéreas de Nicaragua--Lanica), and La Salud dairy--the country's only pasteurized milk facility.”³⁸⁵ They also gained profits from concessions from both national and foreign investors, bribes, and illegal exports. By the end of World War II, Somoza an estimated net worth of sixty million dollars.³⁸⁶

Despite widespread opposition and at times US pressure from the Truman administration, the Somoza family was able to maintain power. Through bribes and constitutional reforms guaranteeing commercial liberties, Somoza was able to bring back limited support from the traditional elite who benefited greatly from the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s.³⁸⁷ The only setback to power was the assassination of the patriarch Anastasio Somoza García on 21 September 1956, while attending a political party in León to celebrate his nomination for the presidency. Somoza was fatally wounded, by Rigoberto López Pérez, a twenty-seven-year- old Nicaraguan poet, who had managed to pass through Somoza robust ever present security.³⁸⁸

Somoza was succeeded as president by his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle. Luis’ brother Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, a West Point graduate, took over the

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

National Guard.³⁸⁹ Luis Somoza brought Nicaragua into the establishment of the Central American Common Market, which was a multinational economic group with the aim of promoting trade among member countries. This partnership provided an economic stimulus that increased trade and manufacturing and diversified the economy.³⁹⁰ Additionally, the Somoza's ardent stance against communism earned him favor and support from the USG.³⁹¹ The Luis Somoza government was the administration that allowed the Cuban exile brigade to use military bases on the Caribbean coast to launch the failed operation.³⁹²

Luis Somoza developed complications with his health, his brother Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, runs in his place and is elected president on February 1967. "With his election, Anastasio Somoza Debayle became president as well as the director of the National Guard, giving him absolute political and military control over Nicaragua. Corruption and the use of force intensified, accelerating opposition from populist and business groups."³⁹³

Nearing the end of his term in 1971, Anastasio Somoza Debayle amends the constitution to stay in power until 1972 causing an increase in opposition to include from within his party.³⁹⁴ Somoza is able to negotiate a political agreement that installs a three

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 168.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 167.

³⁹² Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Somoza Era, 1936-74."

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

member panel or *junta* that would rule from 1972 until 1974, known as the Kupia-Kumi Pact,. “amidst opposition led by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal and his newspaper *La Prensa*.”³⁹⁵

By this time, discontent has grown in response to the deteriorating social conditions. Illiteracy, malnourishment, inadequate health services, and lack of proper housing ignited criticism from the Roman Catholic Church, led by Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo who published a series of letters critical of the Somoza regime.³⁹⁶ The moderate opposition parties were not willing to counter the Somozas' close ties with the US. Additionally, they feared the alternative which would be a more radical opposition, this apprehension drove them to concede and establish very one-sided alliances with the government.³⁹⁷ On 23 December 1972, a powerful earthquake struck Nicaragua destroying most of the capital city of Managua, completely changing the situation in Nicaragua. According to an article published in 1979, the reaction to the natural disaster by the Somoza regime caused political aftershocks that “fatally weakened the structure of Somoza’s rule.”³⁹⁸ The earthquake killed approximately ten thousand and left roughly fifty thousand families homeless, it also destroyed 80 percent of Managua's commercial buildings. As opposed to responding and assisting the thousands dead or displaced, the National Guard joined the widespread looting of the remaining businesses in Managua.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” II.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169.

The Somoza regime, with the National Guard, seized the international relief aid intended for earthquake victims that came into the country and either sold it or distributed only portions of it.⁴⁰⁰

Somoza lead the reconstruction efforts of Managua, the city “was rebuilt on Somoza's land, by Somoza's construction companies, with international aid funneled through Somoza's banks.”⁴⁰¹ The illegal misappropriations of international relief aid, the monopolization of the reconstruction of Managua, and the exploitation of the situation caused his personal wealth to climb, by some estimates, up to four hundred million US dollars by 1974.⁴⁰² His mismanagement and exploitation causes his support base in the upper and middle class that made up the business sector to crumble, it worsened economic conditions, and it revived radical opposition to the regime.⁴⁰³ This was the beginning of the end of the Somoza regime.

Following the earthquake, a wave of strikes, demonstrations and land seizures swept the country from 1972 to 1973.⁴⁰⁴ By 1974, the editor of the newspaper *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, organized seven opposition political parties and two labor confederations into the Union Democrática de Liberación or the Democratic Liberation Union that came to be known as UDEL.⁴⁰⁵ This organization consolidated the

⁴⁰⁰ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “The Somoza Era, 1936-74.”

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴⁰⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169.

moderate opposition against Somoza, their purpose was to negotiate a peaceful change with the Somoza regime.⁴⁰⁶

Another organization rises to prominence against Somoza, the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) or Sandinista National Liberation Front which was established in 1961 by José Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez.⁴⁰⁷ This organization was a more radical organization that modeled itself after Castro's revolutionaries from Cuba. They believed that change could only occur under Somoza through radicalization and taking up arms against the regime.⁴⁰⁸ The FSLN gained strength after the events of the earthquake which caused the greater portion of the population to turn against the regime, particular the rural lower class. Then, on 27 December 1974, 25 FSLN guerrillas conduct a bold operation at a Christmas party in a former government official's house in Managua, capturing twelve of Nicaragua's most prominent business and political leaders.⁴⁰⁹ Through mediation by an anti-Somoza Bishop, Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, the guerrillas and the Somoza government reach an agreement to exchange their hostages for 14 FSLN political prisoners, one million dollars in ransom, and safe passage to Cuba.⁴¹⁰ This operation brings the FSLN national recognition humiliating and further weakening the Somoza regime.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁶ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴⁰⁷ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Rise of the FSLN."

⁴⁰⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169-170.

⁴⁰⁹ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Rise of the FSLN."

This humiliation causes an extreme crackdown against the FSLN that lasted from 1975 to 1977.⁴¹² Somoza declares a state of siege, censoring the press and threatening the opposition with arrest and torture. With an increase of 80 percent in US military aid, he creates an elite counterinsurgency force within the National Guard.⁴¹³ Between the years of 1975-1977, the FSLN suffered numerous casualties and arrests; civil liberties were suspended, curfews were imposed, and censorship increased. Of all demographics, the peasants, workers, and impoverished were severely repressed by the government because they were the base of FSLN collaborators and cadre.⁴¹⁴ According to an article written in 1979, “For two years, peasants in those areas were subjected to a systematic campaign of torture and mass execution. To deprive the FSLN of support, 80 percent of the rural population was uprooted and herded into resettlement camps. The countryside then became a free-fire zone.”⁴¹⁵ The extreme violations of human rights brought national and international attention to the Somoza regime, it also bolstered recruitment for the FSLN.⁴¹⁶

The FSLN splits into three factions following the National Guard’s campaign: the *Proletarios* (Proletarians), who followed traditional Marxist thought and sought to organize factory workers and people in poor neighborhoods; the *Guerra Popular Prolongada* (Prolonged Popular War-GPP), who were influenced by the philosophy of

⁴¹² Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 171.

⁴¹³ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴¹⁴ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 171.

⁴¹⁵ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴¹⁶ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “The Rise of the FSLN.”

Mao Zedong and believed that a revolution would require a long insurrection that included peasants and labor movements; and the *Tendencia Insurreccional*, (Insurrectional Faction) more popularly known as the *Terceristas* (Third Way), who were more pragmatic and called for ideological pluralism.⁴¹⁷ These three factions play a substantial factor in the post-revolutionary government.

Reports by both Amnesty International and the US Department of State confirmed the extreme violations of human rights and internationally condemn the actions.

[Nicaragua another Cuba, III] Once the Carter administration takes over in 1977 with its policy of human rights, President Carter applies the same pressure on Somoza as he did on the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah.⁴¹⁸ US pressure and decrease in US military aid on the grounds of human rights violations have the same effects as it did in Iran.⁴¹⁹ Somoza eases measures of repression, it revitalizes his opposition that had feared the regime because of the US support.⁴²⁰

In October of 1977, the *Terceristas* conduct several attacks on National Guard bases with marginal success. Each attack was repealed, but it exposed some vulnerabilities of the National Guard.⁴²¹ They also go about to establish links to the moderate opposition through opening talks with *Los Doce* (the twelve), a group of twelve

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ See note 116, the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy.

⁴¹⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴²⁰ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

prominent Nicaraguan businessman and academics exiled in Costa Rica.⁴²² Despite these moves towards the unification of opposition forces, the FSLN still lacked the military strength and political prowess to pose a substantial threat to Somoza.

On 10 January 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of *La Prensa* and leader of the UDEL, was assassinated in Managua implicating Somoza's son and the National Guard. Chamorro's assassination has widespread effects in the country.⁴²³ Some historians consider this the turning point in the movement against Somoza because it had two major effects on the opposition that resulted in his removal within a year and a half. First, there was a full mobilization of the political opposition which was dominated by the upper class interests.⁴²⁴ Oppositional parties called for the resignation of Somoza; nationwide protests, to include public and private sectors, went against the regime demanding an end to the dictatorship. The nationwide protest halted both private industry and the government for ten days.⁴²⁵ The National Guard initiated indiscriminate attacks on the population following these protests cause the USG to suspend all military assistance. "The Nicaraguan economy continued its decline; the country suffered from increased capital flight, lack of investment, inflation, and unemployment."⁴²⁶ In essence, Somoza declared war on his people.

⁴²² Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 172.

⁴²⁵ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

The moderate opposition realized that the removal of Somoza with US assistance was not a possibility when the US backed Somoza during peace talks between the moderate opposition and the Somoza regime.⁴²⁷ The second major effect occurs in May of 1978, several moderate organizations united with several radical wings to create the *Frente Amplio de Oposición* (Broad Opposition Front, FAO).⁴²⁸ This organization included most of the moderate opposition and some radical organizations, but it excluded the FSLN. The only connection the FSLN had to the FAO was the pre-established ties the *Terceristas* had with *Los Doce* (the twelve) exposing the vulnerability of a lack of a political arm.⁴²⁹

The FSLN grew in prominence on 22 August 1978, when a group of the *Terceristas*, led by Edén Pastora Gómez (also known as Commander Zero, *Comandante Cero*), took over the National Palace and held almost 2,000 government officials and members of Congress hostage for two days.⁴³⁰ Again, through mediation with Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo and ambassadors from Costa Rica and Panama, the situation is resolved resulting in another embarrassment for the Somoza regime. Somoza conceded to releasing sixty FSLN guerrillas from prison, media broadcasting of an FSLN declaration, a five hundred thousand dollar ransom, and safe passage for the hostage

⁴²⁷ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴²⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 172.

⁴²⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

takers to Panama and Venezuela.⁴³¹ As they were transported to the airport, crowds lined the route cheering for the hostage takers.⁴³²

The humiliation causes and internal cleansing of the National Guard to eliminate suspected conspirators of a coup and ensure loyalty to Somoza.⁴³³ Additionally, a mass general strike across the country following the assault on the National Palace resulting on a violent crackdown by the National Guard as before. The general strike was more widespread than before due to guerrilla actions that sparked mass insurrections in Matagalpa, León, Estelí, Chinandega and Granada.⁴³⁴ The National Guard employed aerial strikes with their ground assaults and retook the contested areas resulting with estimates of over 3000 dead. The FSLN withdrew taking with them thousands of new recruits, as the National Guard began conducting hundreds of summary executions.⁴³⁵ By this point, there would be no negotiations between the Somoza regime and any opposition regardless if they were moderates or radicals.

By the end of 1978, Somoza's regime lost all credibility on the international stage with the publishing of multiple reports condemning his brutal tactics to maintain power and his mounting cases of human rights violations.⁴³⁶ US policy shifts due to the

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 173.

⁴³³ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴³⁴ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 173.

⁴³⁵ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴³⁶ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

increasing international pressure condemning Somoza and the increasing threat of the radical group FSLN. At the beginning of 1979, the US begins urging Somoza to resign and begins talks with the FAO to establish a moderate government that excluded the FSLN.⁴³⁷ The US, on the basis of human rights violations, suspends all aid for Somoza and the National Guard.⁴³⁸ The suspension of US aid takes a drastic effect on the Nicaraguan economy, politics, and military efforts of the National Guard.

The status of the FSLN was further strengthened as Cuba mediated an agreement between the three factions of the FSLN to establish a consolidated Sandinista front.⁴³⁹ Sandinista, after Augusto César Sandino, the general of the Liberal Party who was assassinated on 21 February 1934 who fought against US intervention and for the sovereignty of Nicaragua.

On 30 May 1979, the Sandinistas (FSLN consolidated front) declare the final offensive to topple the Somoza regime.⁴⁴⁰ With the additional fighters and thousands of volunteer collaborators that joined the cause, the Sandinistas begin simultaneous urban insurrections along with military operations to the north, south, and east of Managua. The north falls rapidly due to past success and concentration of support and fighters. The south constituted the fiercest of the fighting between the Sandinistas and the National Guard. The fighting occurred between the Costa Rican border and the city of Rivas, it

⁴³⁷ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴³⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 174.

⁴³⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era.”

⁴⁴⁰ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 174.

continued for several weeks until the Sandinistas were able to take the city of Rivas, and Masaya. The only remaining regime held territory was a portion of Managua. Towards the end of June 1979, the US opened talks with the Sandinistas in the hopes of negotiating a middle class-led government.⁴⁴¹ Sensing victory was near, they rejected all US proposals and continued with an offensive to take the rest of Managua. On 17 July, with the Sandinistas at his doorstep, Somoza resigns and flees the country for exile in Paraguay. The last remnants of the Somoza dynasty also fled Nicaragua as the new government, *Los Doce*, flew in from Costa Rica. At the end of the offensive, approximately fifteen thousand are killed, between forty and fifty thousand were killed between 1977 and the final victory.⁴⁴²

From the onset, an FSLN led government was not acceptable in Nicaragua to US policy due to its previous ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union.⁴⁴³ The Carter administration continued to attempt establishing a moderate government with slight inclusion of the FSLN. He authorized limited aid packages for projects that did not involve the Cuban government.⁴⁴⁴ All attempts were rejected. Once Ronald Reagan was elected President and took office January 1980, he cut all aid and ties to Nicaragua due to suspicion that aid was provided to rebels in El Salvador. President Reagan immediately began funding counter revolutionaries which consisted of Somoza supporters, National

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 175.

⁴⁴³ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era.”

⁴⁴⁴ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III-IV.

Guardsmen, and anti-Somoza opposition groups that lost in the power struggle with the FSLN. This organization became known as the *Contras*.⁴⁴⁵

Between 1981 and 1985, the Reagan administration put over sixty million dollars in military aid in support of the Contras against the FSLN government. Additionally, they pressured Honduras into allowing use of Honduran territory to conduct military exercises.⁴⁴⁶ These exercises served the dual purpose of providing a show of strength to intimidate the Nicaraguan government and bringing in massive amounts of weapons and supplies for the Contras. In 1986, US Congress authorized one hundred million dollars in support to the Contras who continued attacking from its safe havens in Honduras. Additionally, the Reagan administration applied diplomatic and economic pressure suspending all trade and pushing for other countries to do the same.⁴⁴⁷

The Nicaraguan response was to dedicate half of its national budget by 1986 in increasing its military capabilities and implementing counterinsurgency operations to counter the Contras threat.⁴⁴⁸ Following the revolution in 1979, the Sandinista's established a new national army called the *Ejército Popular Sandinista* (EPS) which by the mid 1980s, with Cuban and Soviet support, became the largest and best-equipped force in Central America.⁴⁴⁹ Its counterinsurgency programs proved effective in driving

⁴⁴⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 175.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 176.

⁴⁴⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Sandinista Years, 1979-90."

out the Contras from most of the country by 1988, but it took an economic toll in maintaining the fight.⁴⁵⁰

By the mid-1980s, popular support from other Latin American countries for US policy towards Nicaragua began to wane. Three factors contributed to the suspension of most of the aid going to the Contras from the US by the end of 1987. First, international pressure. The resurgence of violence and instability in Central America caused many of the countries to seek a peaceful resolution in the region.⁴⁵¹ The Central American Peace Accord signed 7 August 1987 laid the basis for the eventual end of aggression between the US and Nicaragua.⁴⁵² Second, successful counterinsurgency efforts against the Contras by the Nicaraguan government left the Contras mostly ineffective.⁴⁵³ Third, the USG was managing various scandals regarding appropriation of funds as well as the Iran-Contra scandal.⁴⁵⁴ These factors caused the US to suspend all aid outside of humanitarian aid from the Contras by the end of 1987.⁴⁵⁵

Analysis

Analysis of Nicaragua will focus on conditions that existed following the taking of power by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1936, with reference made to the first quarter of twentieth century to establish precedence of US intervention, and the fall of the Somoza

⁴⁵⁰ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Regional Peace Effort."

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 176.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Regional Peace Effort."

⁴⁵⁵ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 176.

dynasty and takeover by the Sandinistas in 1979. The analysis will be conducted to determine which indicators of a failed state identified in chapter three contributed to becoming a failed state utilizing the same criteria identified. Indicators will be presented in a similar fashion as the previously, they will follow the chronology in which they presented themselves and how they contributed to each other. In the case of Nicaragua, many of the indicators overlap because they directly correlate with the earthquake of December 1972, or to the aftermath of the natural disaster. Once this analysis is complete, an analysis will be conducted to determine the transitioning to UW was feasible, acceptable, and a viable option following the collapse of the Somoza regime. Its US potential will be evaluated to answer if UW was a viable strategic option for the USG following the collapse of the US friendly regime.

Failed State Indicators

Analysis on Nicaragua will begin with the type and amount of external intervention experienced within the country. US intervention existed in Nicaragua just as it did in Cuba, they depended on US intervention to settle many domestic disputes from the late nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth century.⁴⁵⁶ A contingent of US Marines remained in Nicaragua almost on a continuous basis from 1912 to 1933.⁴⁵⁷ US intervention in the 1930s to mediate a civil war sparked more unrest between a rebel group, the Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua (EDSN) or the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan Sovereignty led by Augusto César Sandino, and US

⁴⁵⁶ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “Foreign Intervention.”

⁴⁵⁷ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 166.

forces.⁴⁵⁸ From 1936, when Anastasio Somoza takes power, to 1978, US intervention comes in the form of economic aid and mutual trade agreements, and massive military support to the National Guard which was originally established by the US.⁴⁵⁹ The external intervention that directly impacted the fall of the regime comes from the way of Cuba supporting the FSLN in the mid to late 1970s.⁴⁶⁰ They become the influential factor that shapes the type and conduct of the revolution against the Somoza regime. Cuba's direct and indirect support contributed greatly to the legitimacy of the Sandinistas and eventual success in toppling the Somoza regime.

Between 1936 and 1972, the Somoza family consolidated power in all aspects of Nicaragua. They established control over the military by always having a relative as director of the National Guard. They appointed close family members to serve as heads of the legislative and judicial branches of government.⁴⁶¹ By the 1940s, the Somoza family owned greater portions of the private sector businesses as well.⁴⁶² His consolidation of control over the political, economic, and security apparatuses did have effects on every facet of Nicaragua, but not enough to cause the unraveling of the regime. Somoza, as a businessman, amassed a great wealth through the 1940s, 50s, and 60s; but he ensured the middle and upper classes benefited as well from the economic programs

⁴⁵⁸ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "United States Intervention, 1909-33."

⁴⁵⁹ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" II.

⁴⁶⁰ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era."

⁴⁶¹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Somoza Era, 1936-74."

⁴⁶² Ibid.

sponsored by the US.⁴⁶³ It was not until the earthquake of 1972, that his dynasty began to unravel.

Just prior to the earthquake in December of 1972, a great deal of discontent existed in the country due to widespread illiteracy, malnourishment, inadequate health services, and lack of proper housing. This ignited criticism from the Roman Catholic Church who published a series of letters and publicized the failings of the regime.⁴⁶⁴

After the earthquake, what health services existed within Managua were destroyed along with 80 percent of commercial buildings causing a massive demographic pressure, the first social indicator discussed.⁴⁶⁵ Lack of essential services led to a massive shortage of water and food for a large portion of the population. The earthquake left a situation that required immediate external support.

Additionally, this natural disaster left roughly fifty thousand families homeless causing a spike in inter-displaced personnel in the country, the second social indicator.⁴⁶⁶ These groups, primarily the poor lower class of Managua, were left with nothing, remaining vulnerable to influence by radical ideology.

As international relief began pouring in, as opposed to even disbursement, it was seized by the National Guard and Somoza and sold leaving the thousands of displaced lower class to fend for themselves.⁴⁶⁷ Additionally, the National Guard participated in the

⁴⁶³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 168.

⁴⁶⁴ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Somoza Era, 1936-74."

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

looting of the many businesses destroyed immediately following the earthquake.⁴⁶⁸ The looting and Somoza's reconstruction of Managua under his management where only he and his inner circle profited from the reconstruction, resulted in alienating primarily the middle and upper class businessmen of the region. This complete failure of governance and breaking of the social contract between the government, military, and people results in drastic effects in all four categories.

Initially, following the denial of the relief aid and monopolization of the reconstruction, every social class had major grievances against the Somoza government, a key social indicator. Every social class had been neglected and alienated. This caused a great deal of tension between the population and the government, who had the capacity to wield the National Guard to repress tension.

Economically, there existed an uneven economic development within the country prior to the earthquake. With the consolidation of all resources, businesses, and power under the Somoza regime prior to the earthquake, this allowed him to control the development after the natural disaster.⁴⁶⁹ His approach unevenly distributes all relief and economic aid. A deep rift between the small group that benefited from the reconstruction and all of the social classes that are alienated develops further feeding into the grievances that were previously discussed.⁴⁷⁰ Poverty and economic decline, the other economic indicator, ensues engulfing the entire country in a crisis. The subsequent general strikes,

⁴⁶⁸ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169.

⁴⁶⁹ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴⁷⁰ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Somoza Era, 1936-74."

demonstrations against the regime, and land seizures as a result of the alienated groups further pushes the economy in decline.⁴⁷¹

The political indicator of public services, being the responsibility of the state, provides insight into how drastic the breaking of the social contract between the regime and the people was. Following the earthquake, the infrastructure was destroyed. As discussed, essential services were unavailable. As opposed to responding to the crisis to provide for the people, the National Guard proceeds to loot the remaining businesses and assists Somoza in seizing the incoming relief aid.⁴⁷² The Somoza regime neglects providing any type of essential services until it is profitable to do so as was done during the reconstruction of Managua, further fueling the fire of unrest.

State legitimacy was always questioned after the Somoza patriarch took power in 1936, but the opposition was either repressed or if not a threat to the regime was allowed in moderation. Following the earthquake and the illegal misappropriations of international relief aid, the monopolization of the reconstruction of Managua, and the exploitation of the situation, the Somoza regime was condemned by a greater part of the international community for needlessly allowing the people to suffer for their economic gains losing any legitimacy as a viable government.⁴⁷³ Particularly in dealing with the aftermath of the disaster. This enraged the opposition groups more so causing further unrest, country wide demonstrations and strikes.

⁴⁷¹ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

⁴⁷² Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169.

⁴⁷³ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Somoza Era, 1936-74."

Politically, an already fractured political group becomes even more factionalized. The factionalized elite, another key political indicator, unite following the earthquake in response to the uneven development and alienation. By 1974, the editor of the newspaper *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, organized seven opposition political parties and two labor confederations into the UDEL, consolidating the moderate opposition against Somoza.⁴⁷⁴ Prior to the earthquake, moderate opposition was hesitant to counter the Somoza regime due to the overwhelming US support. Additionally, radicalized elements rose to prominence capitalizing on the unrest and instability as a result of the mass uprisings against the regime, primarily the FSLN.⁴⁷⁵ Following the violent, indiscriminate attacks by the National Guard on the populace under order of Somoza, both the moderate and radical opposition groups unite against the regime and develop the FAO or Broad Opposition Front.⁴⁷⁶ The elite remain factionalized until after the removal of the Somoza regime.

Human rights and rule of law were cast aside by the Somoza regime time and time again in order to maintain control over the country. Particularly after they declared a state of siege following the FLSN operation on the Christmas party in 1974. The massive crackdown resulted in indiscriminate arrests and torture, particularly on the rural peasants. Most of the rural population, the ones not arrested or executed, are relocated into resettlement camps.⁴⁷⁷ Under persistent attack by the growing FSLN causes the

⁴⁷⁴ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 169.

⁴⁷⁵ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, "The Rise of the FSLN."

⁴⁷⁶ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 172.

⁴⁷⁷ LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" III.

National Guard to respond with more violence and indiscriminately attacking the population.⁴⁷⁸ Human rights violations only worsened after the assassination of Chamorro January of 1978. Somoza essentially declares war on his people utilizing the National Guard and air assets in attacking the population in response to nationwide protests and strikes that halted the private and public sector.⁴⁷⁹ And again Somoza attacks the population following the *Terceristas* operation on the National Palace where they held nearly two thousand government officials hostage and the ensuing general strikes killing over an estimated three thousand to maintain control of the population centers.⁴⁸⁰ These actions receive condemnation from the international community, causes the US to halt all aid, and further radicalizes the already united moderate and radical opposition groups.⁴⁸¹

The final indicator present prior to collapse was the absence of a legitimate security apparatus. The National Guard had always protected the interest of the Somoza regime, but the actions immediately following the earthquake, and subsequent escalating violent responses to the people following the general strikes, and operations of the Sandinistas further delegitimized the National Guard as a viable security apparatus. The National Guard did not protect the populace, they were simply a means of maintaining power in the hands of the Somoza regime.

⁴⁷⁸ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “The Rise of the FSLN.”

⁴⁷⁹ Merrill, ed., *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, “End of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Era.”

⁴⁸⁰ LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” III.

⁴⁸¹ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 174.

UW Potential

With the identification and analysis of indicators present prior to the collapse of the Somoza regime complete, an evaluation will now be conducted to determine the UW potential in Nicaragua following the collapse of the Somoza's regime. An analysis of conditions that existed following the collapse of the Somoza regime and rise of the FSLN to power will determine if the proper physical and human environments were conducive to the transition to UW according to the five criteria explained in the Iranian case study.⁴⁸²

The first criteria, a consolidated structure that could sufficiently divide or weaken the mechanisms of the ruling regime and maintain power and control over the populace existed following the collapse of the Somoza regime. The FAO was a structure specifically designed to go against the Somoza regime, it was made up of moderate and radical organizations with the Sandinistas excluded initially.⁴⁸³ This left the Sandinista government somewhat fractured and unconsolidated in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Somoza regime. The Sandinistas were too radical from the onset, they gained

⁴⁸² Criteria utilized include: (1) A weakened or unconsolidated governmental structure that lacks the capability to maintain power and control over the populace. Additionally, the resistance must have the inverse and possess an organized structure that can fill the void and set the conditions in order to undermine the hostile regime and challenge their ability to regain legitimacy and popular support. (2) The will of the population to bear the hardships associated with the harsh, repressive countermeasures that the hostile regime may employ. (3) Existence of favorable physical and human terrain with the capacity to protect and support a resistance. (4) The organized structure must be willing to cooperate with the US, they must have compatible objectives and ideology, and possess a capable resistance leadership. (5) Confirmation of the ability to transform into an insurgency and pass through the phases of development onto a war of movement in order to undermine and eventually overthrow an occupying power and replace it with a US friendly regime. See Chapter 3 "Research Methodology."

⁴⁸³ Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*, 172.

control because of their military power following the fall of the Somoza regime. The Contras were made up of many of the moderates that lost out in the power struggle to the Sandinistas following the collapse of the regime.⁴⁸⁴ Multiple structures existed that were not ideologically in line with the Sandinistas.

Next, a select portion of the populace of Nicaragua possessed the will to resist the Sandinistas, though it was not as profound as compared to the will to resist the Somoza regime. The upper and middle class of Nicaragua had a vested interest in resisting the radical ideals of the Sandinistas. Unfortunately, they did not possess the numbers to resist alone against the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas enjoyed the support of the rural and urban lower class, the majority of the population in Nicaragua.⁴⁸⁵ What transpires with the Contras is a well-funded, well equipped insurgent force that is not capable of gaining the popular support of the people to cause a mass scale war of movement against the Sandinista government.

In regards to favorable terrain to support a resistance, the physical terrain existed for the resistance in the north and northeast just as it did for the Sandinistas. Though, since that was where that movement took shape, there was insufficient support for the Contras forcing them to move further north into Honduras.⁴⁸⁶ Though the physical terrain was more than sufficient to support the resistance, the human terrain did not exist in Nicaragua.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 175.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 174.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., 175.

The fourth criteria of a resistance force, a resistance force existed, unfortunately they did not have the legitimacy to gain popular support for the movement. The Contras had a command structure, organization, combat experience, were well-funded and well equipped.⁴⁸⁷ But, they were composed of members of the National Guard who lacked the ideology, objectives, and legitimacy to be seen as freedom fighters by the people in Nicaragua as they were described by President Reagan.

An interesting analysis, the Contras had most of the seven dynamics to transition to an insurgency, which they eventually did, but they were incapable of executing a war of movement that caused the local populace to turn against the government. This in part to the gradual moderation and pluralism of the Sandinistas as the struggle continued.⁴⁸⁸ This allowed the Sandinista government the ability to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations denying the Contras ideological access to the local populace.

Conclusion

The Nicaraguan case study is a little more complex in that a UW campaign was truly a campaign not a single military action, though still not successful. However, the strategic objectives were eventually achieved in 1990 with the elections of a moderate government outside of the FSLN/Sandinistas.⁴⁸⁹ In 1979, despite existing consolidated structures that would have been able to meet the criteria, a transition to UW was not

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 177.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 184.

feasible. The movement that removed Somoza was a popular uprising with conflicting ideologies similar to the Iranian case study in which a union was made to remove the Shah. Though, in Nicaragua, moderate opposition was tolerated with the practice of pluralism and gradual moderation that transitioned from radical Marxists views to more conservative views.⁴⁹⁰ As discussed, this contributed to successful counterinsurgency operations within Nicaragua.

Popular support for the Contras did not exist despite US claims to the contrary. The reason for their continuous operations against the Sandinista government was the overwhelming support from the US.⁴⁹¹ On the other hand, this is a perfect example of a whole-of-government approach to removing a regime hostile to US interests. With persistent diplomatic, and economic pressures compounded with the toll the Contras were having with their limited success against the Sandinista government, this holistic approach arguably caused the eventual move to a more moderate government.⁴⁹²

Some historians attribute the gradual pace of change that broke from the Cuban model on three factors. First, the FSLN had compromised its extremely Marxist views when it united with the anti-Somoza movement prior to the collapse. Second, many Nicaraguans were skeptical of the Cuban and Soviet models of economics in the 1980s, the mercantile factor pushed the Sandinista government more towards a social democracy that practiced capitalism. Finally, constant US pressure diplomatically, economically, and through the Contras may have forced moderation for fear of an all-out invasion by the

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., 177.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 176.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 181.

US.⁴⁹³ The whole-of-government approach would have proven effective in removing Somoza from power prior to the Sandinista takeover. If the US would have maintained severe diplomatic pressure on Somoza following the massive general strikes that ensued in January 1978 following the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of *La Prensa* and leader of the UDEL, a transition to UW would have been feasible to remove Somoza from power utilizing the moderate opposition groups. Once the Sandinistas went on the offensive and turned the bulk of the populace (lower class) over to their cause, transition to UW was no longer feasible. Specific targeting of the moderate groups with both economic and military support against Somoza would have marginalized the FSLN and made them a non-factor.

Indicators of a failing state existed following the earthquake of December 1972. This is when the Somoza regime began to unravel and the populace turned against them. Up until that point, despite there not being ideal economic development and distribution, it was still within the threshold of acceptance. The earthquake began a chain of events that caused an overreaction on behalf of the Somoza regime in which the government and the National Guard declared war on the populace. Once the social contract was broken following the earthquake state legitimacy was questioned, grievances towards the government skyrocketed, mass protests and general strikes ensued resulting in immense violations of human rights and rule of law, factionalized elite, and the subsequent collapse of the security apparatus. Though the international community did not let the state fail, the regime failed because of its mismanagement of the crisis and alienation of nearly the entire population. International intervention, led by the US, would have

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 180-181.

prevented the unraveling of the regime. Or in the least, it would have provided an opportunity to ensure legitimacy of US policy in the region remained intact. Again, a whole-of-government approach would have prevented the chain of events from occurring, and would have prevented the radicalization of the moderate opposition. This would have allowed access to a viable replacement government as opposed to the FSLN or Somoza.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

This study set out to determine if unconventional warfare is a viable option following the collapse of a US friendly regime. In order to determine the viability and to ensure enough lead time prior to campaign transition from FID to UW, it is imperative to determine the indicators that signify a US sponsored foreign internal defense campaign is failing. The study was also meant to determine what could be done in preparation for an inevitable collapse to reinstate a US friendly or US neutral regime following a failed FID campaign. The historical analysis conducted utilizing the failed state indicators in chapter 4 illuminated stark similarities between each of the case studies that pointed to trends that assist in answering the research questions of this thesis. Additionally, it illuminated the lack of a doctrinal definition of a failed state, and a doctrinal lack of understanding of the dynamics of a failed state and what effects it has on global security from a military perspective.

In each of the case studies, the transition to UW was not a viable option following the fall of the regime. This alone does not indicate that the transition to UW is not a viable option following the collapse of a US friendly regime in other cases, or in the future, but shows how critical the analysis of the UW potential is for planners and policy makers. Given that UW was not a viable option in Iran following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, in Cuba following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and in Nicaragua following the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979, it is important to understand the likely success of a UW campaign following a failed FID effort.

In each of the case studies, the revolution was a result of a popular uprising against the government where all facets of society, despite differing ideologies, united to topple the government. These popular uprisings against the US sponsored regime left no popular support within the country willing to resist the hostile regime that ensued. In each case, the populace for the most part blamed US intervention for their extreme conditions leaving radicalization as the only option to remove a repressive regime. In each case, the US friendly regime fell to a radicalized group. At this point, once a radicalized group has taken power through a popular uprising, it is too late to transition to UW. It will require a whole-of-government approach utilizing conventional means to achieve the desired endstate of replacing the hostile regime with a US friendly or US neutral regime.

Potential risks exist in adopting that type of strategic policy; risks include resistance to such a policy by both US-domestic and international support, it would be excessively resource intensive, and it could de-stabilize the region negatively affecting US interests in neighboring countries as it did in the Nicaraguan case study. A transition to UW may be a viable option if a violent take over occurs of a US sponsored state where there exists sufficient popular resistance to the new hostile regime. This is something that requires further study.

Analysis of each case study according the failed state indicators resulted in trends that were present in each of the countries. First, each case study had the same four indicators present before the unraveling of the regime and eventual fall. Each country had some form of US intervention in their political system that brought to question the legitimacy of the government, two of the indicators. In Iran, it occurred with Operation AJAX to remove Mohammed Mossadegh from the office of prime minister in 1953; in

Cuba, it occurred with each government in place resulting with the ascension of Batista as a power broker in 1934; in Nicaragua, it occurred with the military occupation from 1912 to 1933. US intervention in each countries' political system brought about questioning of state legitimacy. Additionally, each country had varying degrees of unequal economic development. In each case, economic development was tailored to benefit a select few in society, usually those closest to the regime. Ultimately, US intervention in the electoral or political process, unequal economic development, questions of state legitimacy, and the questioning of legitimacy leads to varying degrees of group grievances. These four indicators present were tolerable in that they did not spark a mass uprising by themselves, but they left a large portion of the populace vulnerable to radical ideology. It was not until the second trend that a mass uprising occurs.

The second trend is that each case study followed a distinct sequence that created a cause-and-effect chain of events that lead to the fall of the regime to a radical group. In each case study a specific event occurs that creates group grievances throughout all facets of society, in essence, a tipping point that made once tolerable transgressions intolerable. These group grievances result in mass protests or general strikes against the government. These mass protests result in violent overreactions of repression by the government. These overreactions usually encompass a wide array of human rights violations that included the killing, arrests, torture, and summary executions of the opposition. From there, the situation continues to escalate both in magnitude and violence. With the onset of the first event that initiates the cause-and-effect chain, there is a union of ideologically aligned opposition groups.

In Iran it was the White Revolution that acts as the initiating event. The White Revolution implemented by the Shah included a secular modernization campaign that alienated the clerical establishment, additionally, land reforms alienated the moderate middle class. After ensuing strikes and protests, the Shah responds by taking violent measures to put down the uprising. In Cuba, it was the coup conducted by Batista in 1952 that alienates the entire populous preventing legitimate governance. There was no crisis in Cuba that required a taking of power, it was simply for self-interest. This initiates the same chain of events that results in the union of like-minded moderate opposition groups, like those in Iran, and the radical groups. In Nicaragua, it was the aftermath of the earthquake of December 1972 that destroys nearly all of the capital city of Managua. The mismanagement, illegal misappropriations of relief aid; looting by the National Guard, and monopolization of the reconstruction under Somoza's companies that leaves the lower class with nothing, and alienates the middle and upper class businessmen.

These events lead to the union of the moderate opposition group to form the UDEL, and the FSLN begins to capitalize on the instability of the ensuing strikes and protests. In each case study, the regime in power utilizes extreme measures to put down demonstrations and uprisings resulting in a mass of human rights violations. These key events are what cause the unraveling of control held by the regimes in power.

The third trend is once violence spikes, it decreases slightly as the opposition groups attempt to find alternative means of reaching a resolution. Then a catalyst event occurs that ends any opportunity for negotiations between the moderate opposition and the regimes in power. This catalyst event causes more wide spread strikes and protests of greater magnitude resulting in even more extreme violent measures utilized by the regime

to maintain control of power. The violent countermeasures and subsequent human rights violations cause suspension of US aid to the regimes weakening the security apparatus. As the regime loses power, radical opposition gains power and influence. It is at this time that moderate opposition begins to unite with radical opposition as a means to an end to remove the regime. The catalyst event in Iran was the economic decline in the 1970s; in Cuba it is when the regime overreacts to protests resulting in Black Friday September of 1958 where thousands of protesters are killed; in Nicaragua it is the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, leader of UDEL, January 1978. This catalyst event serves to radicalize the moderate opposition forcing them to unite with the traditional radical groups for the common goal of replacing the regime. Once the radicalization of the moderate middle class occurs in each case study, the opportunity to transition to a successful UW campaign following collapse has passed, and is no longer a viable option.

Each of the failed state indicators marked some type of vulnerability within the state, a vulnerability that contributed to instability. It is the breaking of the social contract between the government and the governed that initiates the sequence of group grievances expressed by protest, repressed by violent measures resulting in human rights violations, followed by the collapse of the security apparatus, and complete loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace that maps the fall of the regime. In each case, the alienation of the middle class and subsequent radicalization by the catalyst event is the deciding factor for fueling the revolution. The radical opposition group makes minimal changes to its identity and ideology, though, they cannot bring to bear drastic change alone. In each case, the union of the moderate middle class with the radical group is the final push necessary for revolutionary change. Under normal circumstances, the moderate middle

class is not inclined to polarization or radical ideology. It is the middle class, consisting of doctors, lawyers, merchants, and scholars; that are the influential group that possess the capability and brain power to lead and organize substantial change at the community level and beyond.

Recommendations

First, in FID campaign planning, it is imperative to define the parameters of a successful FID campaign according to US policy and in support of US interests. FID campaign planners must understand the host nation's full range of measures taken to promote its growth and protect itself within its internal defense and development plan. This information, a requirement already included in doctrine, is vital to establish the status quo in that country.⁴⁹⁴ With the status quo established, next the failed state indicators must be applied to monitor drastic political, economic, social, or security changes in the environment. A modified set of fragile state indicators that directly correlates with military operations must be included in FID doctrine as a mechanism to monitor change, and to serve as measures of performance or measures of effectiveness of programs implemented to prevent a failing or failed state and promote stability (see figure 2). The indicators below have been modified and include nine of the twelve indicators that applied to analysis and were present in each of the case studies prior to the fall of the respective regimes. The definitions were modified to fit application to FID campaign planning. These indicators will be key in tailoring military support for the

⁴⁹⁴ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-22, *Doctrine for Joint Foreign Internal Defense*, IV-2.

operational environment to serve the specific needs of the HN that the US supports through FID, which is one of the key imperatives in FID campaign planning.⁴⁹⁵

Social and Economic Indicators		
Group Grievances Tension and violence exists between groups that undermines the state's ability to provide security creating further fear and violence. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • general discrimination and powerlessness caused by religious, ethnic, sectarian, and or communal violence. 	Uneven Economic Development A greater disparity of income and development indicating a smaller group controls a higher percentage of the income share and benefits from the limited development. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ethnic, religious, or regional disparities • accounts for the slum population • measures the distribution of urban-rural services • measures overall access to improved services 	Poverty and Economic Decline The effects caused by mismanagement of national resources. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • measures the economic deficit, government debt, purchasing power, GDP and growth rate, inflation and the effects of the unemployment and youth employment • causes friction between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'
Political and Military Indicators		
State Legitimacy The overall measurement of government effectiveness. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • considers levels of democracy, corruption, political participation, and the electoral process • considers protests and demonstrations, power struggles, drug trade, and the illicit economy 	Public Services Measurement the availability and effectiveness of the infrastructure that is provided by the state. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assesses the quality of healthcare, internet access, energy reliability, water, sanitation, educational provisions, and the existing road system • considers the effectiveness of the policing of criminal activity 	Human Rights and Rule of Law The assessment of the state's ability to evenly protect the civil liberties of the populace. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assesses press freedom, amount of religious persecution • measures cases of political prisoners, torture, executions, and human trafficking
Security Apparatus The ability of legitimate military and police forces to provide security for the populace and maintain a monopoly of legitimate force. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • affected by internal conflict, rebel activity, riots and protests, militancy, bombings, and small arms proliferation • considers military coups and political prisoners 	Factionalized Elite The power struggle between local and national leaders that undermines the social contract and creates fragility in the state. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • measures frequency and magnitude of power struggles, defectors, and flawed elections 	External Intervention Intervention by external actors due to failure by the state to meet its domestic or international obligations. Characteristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • positive and or negative influencing in the form of foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers and UN missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions

Figure 2. Modified Fragile State Indicators

Source: Created by author based on original work done by J. J. Messner ed. *Fragile States Index X 2014*, 10 and the Fragile State Indicators Chart, see Figure 1.

Second, the importance of identifying a failing or failed state early, and ideally as part of the measures of effectiveness of the FID campaign plan, is essential to regional stability and global security. Identifying a failing state early can allow time to intervene to prevent collapse and to prevent potential safe havens for transnational violent extremist organizations or general lawlessness. A doctrinal definition for a failing or failed state

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

must be included in military doctrine to expand understanding and comprehension of this phenomena. The definition of a failing or failed state should read: A state rendered ineffective due to internal or external factors that prevent the ability to provide security, governance that includes legislative and judicial apparatuses, basic public services that include but are not limited to essential services, health services, education, and meet the basic welfare needs of the state; a loss of control of substantial sovereign territory, legitimate authority, or the breaking of the social contract; the inability to participate as a full member of the international community.

Third, in order for a transition to UW to be a viable strategic option, preparation must be done prior to the radicalization of the moderates and or the middle class, when it is determined that FID is failing, and the US sponsored regime is beginning to unravel.⁴⁹⁶ During the FID campaign, a detailed mapping of the human terrain is necessary to determine key players in the operational environment. Constant monitoring of failed state indicators will reveal a key event that causes a spike in group grievances affecting a wide spectrum of the populace, not just one specific group. To make a distinction between moderates and the middle class, moderates by relation are not extreme or excessive in their political affiliations or inclinations towards ideology.⁴⁹⁷ The middle class is based on economic status, it includes those that are intermediate between the upper elite and the

⁴⁹⁶ Preparation of the environment is not UW. Preparation of the environment must be conducted during the execution of the FID campaign as the environment remains permissive or semi-permissive. Preparation of the environment can be done concurrent with assessments of the effectiveness of the FID campaign and IDAD plan.

⁴⁹⁷ Dictionary.com, “middle class,” accessed 4 May 2015, [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/middle class](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/middle+class).

impoverished that live below the poverty line.⁴⁹⁸ If the moderates and or the middle class are effected, and movements begin organizing against the regime, this may be an indicator that the current regime is no longer in line with US policy and US interests; particularly if they are going against their IDAD plan and causing instability.

If violations of human rights and rule of law occur, a suitable moderate group must be identified and approached in a clandestine manner while in a permissive environment to assess suitability of the organization according to the five criteria of UW potential discussed above. If suitable, the moderate opposition group must be supported and trained as per UW doctrine, pending approval by the President of the United States, to establish the necessary infrastructure and networks required for a resistance and transition to insurgency if the need arises.⁴⁹⁹

US aid to the belligerent regime should not be cut off until a reasonable alternative is ready to assume the role of governance or of a shadow government. If the current regime does not comply with the necessary changes to support the HN IDAD, and they continue to pose a substantial threat to US interests and stability as a whole, US aid should be suspended in conjunction with activation of the moderate opposition to resist the government. FID is terminated and a transition to UW is near immediate with US aid diverted to the moderate opposition in order to overthrow the hostile regime. The network and infrastructure must be built before hand to ensure sufficient capability is available to resist the current or new regime that is no longer in-line with US interests.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Approval by the President of the United States is tied to the potential impending failure of the FID campaign.

The principle of this approach is to isolate the moderate opposition from radicalization. A focus on the moderates marginalizes radical efforts at a takeover, radical groups regardless of ideology remain at the periphery of the resistance (see Figure 3). Radicals will mostly remain anti-government in relation to the spectrum of support for the government as pro-government entities will remain loyal to the regime. It is the moderate group that must not be alienated. An early focus on the moderates ensures moderate succession after the regime fails, if it does so. An early focus on developing and expanding the middle class diversifies economic development. A strong middle class decreases the probability of group grievances, uneven economic development, and potentially poverty and economic decline by creating opportunities for upward economic mobility. By promoting the moderates and the middle class, US policy maintains some form of popular support in the region that will contribute to long term stability.




Figure 3. Spectrum of Government Support

Source: Created by author.

Risks to US policy and US interests exist on waiting until the US sponsored regime fails to implement UW as an option. As shown in the case studies, the possibility

of a radical group assuming power is a very real certainty. Once the regime previously supported by the US falls, it compromises US legitimacy in the region and the international community; and it results in the ultimate loss of US interest in the state. Ideally, with the decrease in power of the regime, the moderates and or the middle class will fill the void forcing a peaceful resolution with the failing regime. As in any other case, UW as a strategic policy should be a last resort. If implemented, it must be a whole-of-government approach in supporting the moderate and or middle class and a transition back to FID.

This study has focused on UW as the follow on effort to a failed US FID campaign, however, two other options emerged during this research which deserve further study, specifically on the viability of US support to these efforts based on historical success. One such option is a military coup.⁵⁰⁰ If sufficient leaders or personnel exist in the military that are in-line with US interests and oppose the hostile regime, they can be leveraged and or supported to carry out replacing the hostile regime with a moderate government more in-line with US interests.

A second option is a popular uprising, such as occurred in the Middle East with the Arab Spring.⁵⁰¹ The US has had varying degrees of success supporting these types of mass mobilizations, they rarely turn out as planned. The modified fragile states indicators could be utilized to determine vulnerabilities within a state and exploited to increase group grievances and promote instability and eventually fracture the hostile regime's structure of authority. In comparing the three options, each comes with a level of risk that

⁵⁰⁰ LTC Derek Jones, email to author, 18 April 2015.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

increases as effort is expended over longer periods of time (see Figure 4). A military coup would be the quickest with the least amount of US effort minimizing risk. As time and effort increase, so does that risk as shown with a sponsored popular uprising. Lastly, and as this study described, is the most time and resource intensive option, UW. The risk of failure increases as length of the UW campaign lengthens.




Figure 4. Options Time/Risk Analysis

Source: Created by author through emails and discussions with LTC Derek Jones.

Areas for Further Research

During the research of this project, numerous other areas of research came to light that warrant further study: First, is a transition to UW a viable option if a violent take over occurs of a US sponsored state where there exists sufficient popular resistance to the new hostile regime? Further research should include the transition to UW when the

regime itself has turned hostile to US interests or US policy. Other research must include the failed state indicators applied to a more modern case studies such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, or even Ukraine to determine the potential for a failed state ensuing. Additionally, if the USG decides to exercise other options such as a coup or a popular uprising, what would be the role of the the Department of Defense if any?

GLOSSARY

Clandestine Operation – An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.⁵⁰²

Counterinsurgency – Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN.⁵⁰³

Covert Operation – An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.⁵⁰⁴

Denied Area – An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities.⁵⁰⁵

Feasibility Assessment – A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. Also called FA.⁵⁰⁶

Foreign Internal Defense – US activities that support a HN's internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.⁵⁰⁷

Guerrilla Force – A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰² Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 *Special Operations*, GL-06.

⁵⁰³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Doctrine for Joint Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), GL-05.

⁵⁰⁴ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 *Special Operations*, GL-07.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., II-10.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., GL-07

Insurgency – The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.⁵⁰⁹

Low-Visibility Operations – Sensitive operations wherein the diplomatic-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities and with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power.⁵¹⁰

Operational Preparation of the Environment – The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Also called OPE.⁵¹¹

Paramilitary Forces – Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.⁵¹²

Preparation of the Environment – An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. Also called PE.⁵¹³

Resistance Movement – An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.⁵¹⁴

Special Forces – United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF.⁵¹⁵

Special Operations – Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or

⁵⁰⁹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-24 *Doctrine for Joint Counterinsurgency*, GL-05.

⁵¹⁰ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 *Special Operations*, GL-08.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., GL-09.

⁵¹² Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-24 *Doctrine for Joint Counterinsurgency*, GL-05.

⁵¹³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 *Special Operations*, GL-09.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., GL-10.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.⁵¹⁶

Special Operations Forces – Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF.⁵¹⁷

Subversion – Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.⁵¹⁸

Unconventional Warfare – Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., GL-11.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-24 *Doctrine for Joint Counterinsurgency*, GL-05.

⁵¹⁹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 *Special Operations*, GL-12.

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